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ABSTRACT 
Rebel groups and insurgencies have been an important topic of study for several 
decades, particularly with the rise and success of groups like Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, 
Hamas, and the Islamic State. When rebel groups such as these are discussed in the media 
and in popular culture, they are generally portrayed purely as violent organizations bent 
on imposing strict religious doctrines on an unwilling population. Often missing in these 
discussions are the nuances of how rebel groups actually act and operate. There are 
numerous cases of rebel groups gaining territory and governing over their constituents 
effectively and efficiently—sometimes better than the official state government. 
Using across-case and within-case analysis of Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), this thesis explains why Islamist militant groups 
choose to provide governance and public goods to a population instead of primarily 
using coercive violence to achieve their goals. Ultimately, this thesis finds that rebel 
legitimacy and territorial control along with overall group capability are the most 
important factors behind rebel governance. 
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Rebel groups and insurgencies have been an important topic of study for several 
decades, particularly with the rise and success of groups like Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Hamas, 
and the Islamic State. When rebel groups such as these are discussed in the media and in 
popular culture, they are generally portrayed solely as violent and ruthless organizations 
bent on imposing strict religious doctrines on an unwilling population. Often missing in 
these discussions are the nuances of how rebel groups actually act and operate. Although 
70 percent of rebel groups do not provide public goods or services,1 there are numerous 
cases of rebel groups gaining territory and governing over their constituents effectively and 
efficiently—sometimes better than the official state government.2 
Apart from the Islamic State, al Qaeda and its affiliates have been the most 
concerning insurgent groups for the United States and its allies for two decades. Western 
countries and their Middle Eastern allies have experienced thousands of civilian and 
military casualties at the hands of al Qaeda, and the study of al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) remains vital to the security of Western countries and their allies. The 
United States has also remained concerned with the strength and operations of Hamas in 
the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon since the 1980s, in part due to the United States’ 
close relationship with Israel. Interestingly, despite their designation as terrorist 
organizations, all three groups have displayed strong elements of rebel governance and 
have provided goods and services to their constituents. 
This thesis will explain why Islamist militant groups have provided governance and 
public goods to the constituents within their territory. While many aspects of rebel-civilian 
                                                 
1 Megan Stewart, “Civil War as State Building: Strategic Governance in Civil War,” International 
Organization 72, no. 1 (2017): 206. 
2 Notable examples of rebel groups that have provided extensive levels of governance and public 
goods include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in 
the Palestinian Territories, Sendero Luminoso in the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru, and the African Party 
for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea-Bissau. 
2 
relationships have been studied in-depth, such as the use of violence and recruitment, rebel 
governance has been understudied to date.3 By casting a light on rebel governance, scholars 
may gain greater understanding into rebel-civilian interactions, and how and why 
insurgents provide public goods. These studies may help scholars and policymakers to 
understand insurgent motives and provide better prediction of rebel behavior.4 This 
research may also provide insight on the potential for states to fight the influence of 
extremist groups by way of public goods provisions. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
1. Civil War 
According to Stathis Kalyvas, civil war is broadly defined as “armed combat within 
the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common 
authority at the outset of the hostilities.”5 By Kalyvas’s definition, most ethnic 
insurgencies, sustained peasant insurrections, revolutions, anti-colonial uprisings, and 
resistance against foreign occupation classify as civil wars. Violent protests, low-level 
banditry, and riots are typically excluded from the category of civil wars as they leave state 
sovereignty intact.6 
2. Rebel Groups and Insurgents 
For the purposes of this thesis, the terms rebel groups, rebel organizations, and 
insurgents will be used interchangeably. In general terms, rebel organizations are 
“consciously coordinated groups whose members engage in protracted violence with the 
intention of gaining undisputed political control over all or a portion of a pre-existing 
                                                 
3 Zachariah Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 7–15; Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly, 
“Introduction,” in Rebel Governance in Civil War, ed. Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3–4. 
4 Nelson Kasfir, “Rebel Governance—Constructing a Field of Inquiry: Definitions, Scope, Patterns, 
Order, Causes” in Rebel Governance in Civil War, ed. Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 44. 
5 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 17. 
6 Kalyvas, 19. 
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state’s territory.”7 These groups may be conventional military forces defecting from the 
state or irregulars utilizing guerrilla tactics, and may target their efforts toward the state, 
opposing rebel groups, or both. This includes groups that seek to overthrow the state, 
secessionist groups that pursue their own territory, as well as other belligerents seeking 
significant changes or reforms from the government.8 
Civilians are distinct from rebel groups insomuch as they do not plan, lead, or 
participate in combat. Although groups vary in how informally civilians and insurgents can 
move from one to the other, civilians are not classified as rebels or insurgents just because 
they provide material or popular support to the rebel organization.9 
3. Governance 
Rebel rule can vary greatly from group to group. Some may focus on strict 
regulation of local residents while others provide governance, services, and promote 
civilian participation.10 A broad definition of rebel governance includes any group that 
does one of the following: establishes a governing administration or structure over 
civilians, encourages civilian participation in decision-making (as evidenced by the 
creation of legislatures, local councils, or civilian advisory boards), or establishes 
regulations or taxes on commercial goods or services.11 These governing structures may 
evolve over the course of a conflict and are likely to change over prolonged periods of 
fighting. 
                                                 
7 Kasfir, “Rebel Governance—Constructing a Field of Inquiry: Definitions, Scope, Patterns, Order, 
Causes,” 24. 
8 Kasfir, 24; Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17. 
9 Kasfir, “Rebel Governance—Constructing a Field of Inquiry: Definitions, Scope, Patterns, Order, 
Causes,” 24. 
10 Kasfir, 23. 
11 Kasfir, 32–34. 
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4. Public Goods  
Public goods and services can be provided in a variety of ways. Groups may provide 
education or medical services to their constituents, or even establish programs for 
distributing food, collecting garbage, or establishing law and order.12 Depending on the 
organization, these goods may be distributed to a targeted group of participants only 
(exclusive provision) or more widely to a large segment of the population regardless of 
participation (inclusive provision). Public goods and services may be used interchangeably 
with the terms social welfare and welfare provision. 
5. Violence 
Methods of violence employed by rebel groups can take on a variety of forms. Far 
more than just killings and death tolls, rebel violence includes a variety of human rights 
violations and atrocities aimed at combatants, non-combatants, or both. Forms of violence 
include killings, beatings of non-combatants, rape of women and children, abduction, 
pillaging, forced relocation and labor, acts of destruction and terrorism, or threats to 
commit any of the aforementioned acts.13 
Similar to the provision of public goods, violence can be distinguished between 
selective violence and indiscriminate violence. While selective violence is targeted only 
against those participating against the rebel group, indiscriminate violence is used against 
its victims regardless of participation.14 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Civilians represent both a challenge and an opportunity for rebel groups. While 
civilians are capable of betraying rebels and assisting the government or a rival group, they 
can also provide rebels with recruits, information, and food.15 Assistance from civilians 
was a key goal of the two most prominent revolutionaries of the twentieth century, Mao 
                                                 
12 Stewart, “Civil War as State-Making: Strategic Governance in Civil War,” 205–207 
13 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, 18, 199–201. 
14 Weinstein, 19. 
15 Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, “Introduction,” 3. 
5 
Tse-Tung and Che Guevara. Both Mao and Guevara emphasized the importance of civilian 
support and collaboration16 and their writings have inspired rebel groups for decades. 
Similar to Kalyvas’ argument that civilian support is based on “varying combinations of 
persuasion and coercion,”17 Mao argued that establishing systems of governance and 
maintaining civilian support were essential for rebel survival.18 Guevara, meanwhile, 
emphasized the role of addressing social welfare through public goods.19 By providing 
governance, these revolutionaries both believed they could win over the local populace 
while dissuading them to support the government. According to Grynkewich, rebel 
governance and public good provision also have the effect of threatening the legitimacy of 
the state government as derived from the social contract.20 
The existing scholarly literature on why rebel governance occurs can be divided 
into five primary arguments: legitimacy and rebel territorial control, secessionism, state’s 
territorial penetration, and rebel capacity. 
• Legitimacy and Rebel Territorial Control 
Several scholars have examined the role that building legitimacy plays in rebel 
governance, with Mampilly emphasizing the need to provide public goods as a way for 
rebel groups to gain legitimacy and support from constituents.21 He argues that the 
relationship between rebels and civilians is a form of social contract, and that in order to 
achieve cooperation rebel groups must maintain their end of the social contract through 
governance and public goods.22 Stewart argues that secessionist insurgencies use inclusive 
                                                 
16 Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Mampilly, 11–
14; Mao Tse-Tung, Basic tactics (New York: Praeger, 1966), 130–144; Mao Tse-Tung, On Protracted War 
(Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2001). 
17 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 101. 
18 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War, 12. 
19 Mampilly, 12. 
20 Alexus G. Grynkewich, “Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services 
to Attack the State,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 350. 
21 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War, 52–53. 
22 Mampilly, 52–53, 55, 58. 
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goods in order to legitimize their territorial claims and that they strive to gain recognition 
of their statehood and legitimacy through domestic and international support.23 By 
providing inclusive goods and services, rebel groups are able to mimic state functions and 
legitimize their claims of sovereignty. 
Other scholars have emphasized the role that territorial control plays in rebel 
governance. Researches have shown that groups with territorial control are more likely to 
attempt to build a positive reputation within their constituency compared with groups 
without territorial control (once a low-level threshold of reputation has been crossed).24 
Other scholars have treated territorial control as an assumed characteristic of rebel groups 
who attempt to create systems governance,25 while Kasfir has explicitly argues that 
territorial security is a precondition for rebel governance.26 Kalyvas, however, maintains 
that rebel groups can provide low-levels governance without territorial security, but that 
rebels must have long-term security over their territory in order to provide high-level 
governance.27 This is because the successful implementation of goods and services 
“requires a long-term rebel administration with a stable presence.” 
Mampilly argues that there are multiple levels of territorial control, which will vary 
spatially and temporally. He claims that in contested areas, rebel groups are more likely to 
use strategies focused on winning the “hearts and minds” of civilians.28 He clarifies this 
assertion to argue that rebel groups will generally need to have “a sufficient period of 
territorial control” in order to provide advanced levels of governance, to include a civilian 
                                                 
23 Stewart, “Civil War as State-Making: Strategic Governance in Civil War,” 205–226. 
24 Seden Akcinaroglu and Efe Tokdemir, “To Instill Fear or Love: Terrorist Groups and the Strategy 
of Building Reputation,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2016, 16, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0738894216634292. 
25 Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, “Introduction,” 1. 
26 Kasfir, “Rebel Governance—Constructing a Field of Inquiry: Definitions, Scope, Patterns, Order, 
Causes,” 25. 
27 Stathis Kalyvas, “Performing the Nation-State: Rebel Governance and Symbolic Processes” in 
Rebel Governance in Civil War, ed. Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 152. 
28 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War, 59–60. 
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government apparatus and public welfare provision.29 This is largely because groups 
without territorial control are more focused on defending their territory than on providing 
goods and services to constituents.30 
The correlation between rebel legitimacy and territorial control with rebel 
governance provides the basis for the first hypothesis of this thesis:  
H1: Territorial security and legitimacy are significant factors behind insurgents’ 
decision and ability to provide governance and public goods to their constituents. 
• Secessionism 
Recent studies have also emphasized groups’ goals as a major factor for rebel 
governance. Secessionist groups which strive to create an independent state are more likely 
to create new systems of governing civilians, while non-secessionist groups are focused on 
taking control of the state from within by overthrowing the central government and are able 
to choose to keep existing government structures, create new ones, or do nothing until after 
victory is achieved.31 Mampilly also argues that secessionist groups are more likely to 
develop effective systems of government compared with non-secessionist groups (who 
strive to capture existing power structures).32 Similarly, Stewart argues that secessionist 
groups are more likely to provide civilians with inclusive incentives and public goods while 
non-secessionist groups typically use exclusive incentives.33 
The role that secession plays in a group’s use on governance provides the basis for 
the second hypothesis:  
H2: Secessionist rebel groups are more likely to provide governance and public 
goods to their constituents than non-secessionist groups. 
                                                 
29 Mampilly, 63. 
30 Mampilly, 63. 
31 Kasfir, “Rebel Governance—Constructing a Field of Inquiry: Definitions, Scope, Patterns, Order, 
Causes,” 40; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War, 74. 
32 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War, 214–217.  
33 Stewart, “Civil War as State-Making: Strategic Governance in Civil War,” 205–226. 
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• State’s Territorial Penetration 
An additional factor behind rebel governance is based on the previous level of 
societal penetration by the incumbent government. Mampilly argues that effective 
governance is less likely in places of low-level state-penetration, and that in places of 
strong state-penetration, rebel groups will co-opt the existing networks and institutions into 
its new governmental infrastructure.34 Other scholars have argued the opposite, asserting 
that rebel governments are more likely to take root in areas where state presence is weak.35 
According to Wickham-Crowley’s studies of Latin America, rebels are more likely to form 
counter-states that effectively serve in the traditional capacity of the governments when the 
incumbent government is weak.36 These counter-states typically have high levels of rebel 
governance and are capable of providing police and judicial functions, material security 
and welfare, as well as physical security from outside attacks.37 
Wickham-Crowley’s argument that strong rebel governance emerges in weak states 
provides the basis of the third hypothesis:  
H3: Rebel groups that exist in weak states are likely to provide governance and 
public goods to their constituents.  
• Rebel capacity 
The final major approach to rebel governance is based on the capacity of the rebel 
group itself. By examining rebel capabilities (military strength, leadership quality, foreign 
sponsorship, social capital, and resource financing among others), Wood argues that weak 
groups are incentivized to use violence against civilians because they are unable to provide 
                                                 
34 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War, 68–73, 210–214. 
35 Mampilly, 49–50. 
36 Timothy Wickham-Crowley, “Del Gobierno de Abajo al Gobierno de Arriba … and Back: 
Transitions to and from Rebel Governance in Latin America, 1956–1990,” in Rebel Governance in Civil 
War, ed. Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 50–51. 
37 Wickham-Crowley, 47. 
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sufficient incentives for civilian support.38 Strong groups, meanwhile, have fewer 
incentives to use violence over time and are more likely to “purchase” civilian loyalty using 
incentives.39 Wood’s analysis of rebel group strength is based on the ratio of rebel forces 
to government forces, popular mobilization capability, and level of foreign sponsorship.40 
Wood’s argument on the role of rebel capability provides the basis of the fourth 
and final hypothesis: 
H4: Rebel groups with greater overall capability are more likely to provide 
governance and public goods to their constituents than groups with moderate to weak 
capability. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND FINDINGS 
The three case studies examined in this thesis are Hezbollah, Hamas, and AQAP. 
Across-case and within-case comparisons of these groups allow for an analysis of the 
causal factors behind a group’s decision to utilize governance over violence. Studying these 
groups presents useful comparisons in the ultimate goal of explaining Islamist militant 
governance. 
Research for this thesis is based on a qualitative, multi-case study analysis. While 
quantitative data and statistics are used when appropriate, a qualitative approach provides 
a more nuanced and holistic approach. Due to the unique backgrounds and complex 
variables of the rebel groups in this thesis, a comparative and qualitative approach provides 
a better understanding to the multi-faceted and interconnected variables involved. 
Research for this thesis relied heavily on academic books and journal articles for 
general information of the groups involved, interactions with civilians, the use of violence, 
and levels of governance and public good provision. This thesis also utilizes primary 
                                                 
38 Reed M. Wood, “Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint? Rebel Capabilities, the Origins 
of Support, and Civilian Victimization in Civil War,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 31, no. 5 
(2013): 463–468, 472; Reed M. Wood, “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians,” 
Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 601–605, 610. 
39 Wood, “Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint?,” 463. 
40 Wood, 469. 
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sources from the rebel organizations and their leaders in addition to journalistic accounts 
that address these groups, their operations, and civilian interviews depicting personal 
experiences. 
From examining the existing literature on rebel governance and the three case 
studies in this thesis, I ultimately argue that the most significant reasons in explaining rebel 
governance concern territorial security and legitimacy (Hypothesis 1) and the overall 
capability and funding of the rebel group (Hypothesis 4). While secessionist motivations 
(Hypothesis 2) and the presence of a weak state (Hypothesis 3) may play a role, their impact 




II. HEZBOLLAH CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Hezbollah serves as an insightful organization to examine regarding rebel violence 
and public good provision. Since its creation in 1982, Hezbollah has actively engaged in 
social welfare programs to benefit the constituents within its territory. Interestingly, while 
it has engaged in reoccurring violent conflict with Israel, its use of violence within Lebanon 
as a whole has typically been minimal and its use of violence against its constituents almost 
non-existent. 
This case study will discuss the development of Hezbollah and how it fits into the 
complicated and chaotic history of Lebanon, in addition to its use of violent and non-violent 
strategies. It will also examine how this case study fits into the hypotheses listed in the first 
chapter and how they compare with Hamas and AQAP. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Hezbollah began in 1982 and operated primarily in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley.41 By 
the time Hezbollah became fully operational in 1984, it had expanded into southern 
Lebanon. Hezbollah formally announced itself and its military wing, the Islamic Resistance 
brigades, in 1985 with the publication of “An Open Letter: The Hezbollah Program.”42 
Before its evolution into a legitimate political actor, Hezbollah’s early identity was as an 
armed militia group fighting against Israeli occupation and against other Lebanese militias 
during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990).43 
Several regional and national conditions factored in Hezbollah’s creation and rise. 
By the 1980s, the Middle East had grown increasingly disenchanted with pan-Arabism. 
                                                 
41 Joshua L. Gleis and Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas a Comparative Study (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 35; Krista E. Wiegand, Bombs and Ballots: Governance by 
Islamist Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups (London: Taylor and Francis, 2016), 92–93. 
42 Lebanese Hezbollah, “Open Letter Addressed to the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World,” News 
Release, February 16, 1985, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000361273.pdf; 
Wiegand, Bombs and Ballots, 92. 
43 Wiegand, Bombs and Ballots, 92. 
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This secular notion, championed by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and other leaders 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, began its decline after Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six-
Day War.44 Combined with widespread political and military failures throughout the 
region, political Islam rose as a prominent alternative.45  
The 1979 Iranian Revolution was perhaps more important, sparking notions of 
political Islam throughout the Muslim world—particularly among Shia Muslims. Shia felt 
empowered and emboldened by what they saw in Iran, and the Islamic Republic made it 
its goal to export the revolution to Muslim countries around the world.46 
Domestically, Lebanese Shia, who make up 1.4 million of Lebanon’s roughly 4 
million citizens, were underrepresented politically and felt treated as second-class citizens 
by the country’s Christian and Sunni population.47 The Shia-dominated southern suburbs 
of Beiruit, for example, constituted one-sixth of Lebanon’s population in 1993 and, in some 
parts, had an average per capita income at 14 percent of the average Lebanese citizen.48 
The 1975 invasion by Syria and particularly the 1982 invasion by Israel furthered the belief 
among Lebanese Shia that they must take care of themselves and were a crucial factor 
behind the birth of Hezbollah.49 
Hezbollah was formed as a new organization by a union of young leaders from 
several other parties, namely the existing Shia militia group Amal.50 After the 1982 Israeli 
invasion, Iran provided much-needed money and weapons to the young group, even 
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sending fifteen-hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guards to provide training to Hezbollah 
fighters.51 
In its early years, Hezbollah was adamantly opposed to participating in the 
Lebanese political system and even refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
government.52 Like other armed groups involved in the civil war (the consolidated 
Christian group named the Lebanese Forces, the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), and the Progressive Socialist Party), Hezbollah developed a social services program 
in order to provide public goods to those within its territory.53 Hezbollah, however, 
suffered a decline in support by the end of the civil war due to the heavy losses Lebanon 
suffered from Israel and an unpopular system of imposing harsh Islamic law in Hezbollah 
strongholds.54  
The Lebanese civil war ended in November 1989 (although some fighting 
continued into 1990) with the signing of the Taif Accord and Syria’s promise to assist in 
establishing peace. For various reasons, Hezbollah was the only armed political group in 
Lebanon that did not disarm following the Taif Accord.55 While Syria supported both 
Hezbollah and its primary adversary, Amal, until its departure in 2005, Syria’s presence 
was overall beneficial to Hezbollah as it assured that Hezbollah could continue receiving 
supplies from Iran. Hezbollah’s popularity steadily rose throughout the 1990s due to its 
successful military achievements against Israel and the vast social welfare network it 
provided to Shia populations.56 
With both the ratification of the Taif Accord and the death of Iran’s Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1989, Hezbollah shifted in favor of participation in Lebanese politics and 
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elections.57 Although done primarily for pragmatic reasons, this was nevertheless a 
watershed moment for Hezbollah and a major change from its past views. Hezbollah 
leaders believed that participation in the existing system would allow it to bring about 
greater change than could be achieved through attempts to overthrow the political 
system.58 Hezbollah continued to soften its tone, embraced Lebanese patriotism and 
nationalism, began working with Christian parties and communities, and participated in 
parliamentary elections beginning in 1992 and municipal elections in 1998.59 Although 
Hezbollah initially restricted its participation to parliamentary and municipal elections, 
Hezbollah joined the government’s executive cabinet after Syria’s 2005 withdrawal from 
Lebanon.60  
Although Hezbollah largely abandoned domestic violence in favor of political 
participation, it is believed to have been responsible for the 2005 assassination of Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri61 and seized control of large parts of the capital city of Beirut 
in a violent 2008 conflict between pro-government forces and Hezbollah-led opposition.62 
While some scholars predicted the decline of Hezbollah after Israel’s withdrawal 
from southern Lebanon, its representation in parliament increased steadily throughout the 
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1990s and 2000s.63 Syria and Iran have continued their assistance to Hezbollah, further 
fueling the group’s important role in Lebanese politics.64 
C. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
To understand Hezbollah’s primary goals and ideology, it is important to examine 
the themes and statements of its 1985 Open Letter and 2009 Manifesto. With clear anti-
American and anti-Israeli sentiment throughout, the 1985 Open Letter listed four 
objectives: forcing Israel out of Lebanon along with their eventual destruction; forcing the 
United States, France, and their allies from Lebanon; justice against the Phalange for their 
cooperation with the United States and Israel; and the creation of a system of government 
chosen by the people, with Hezbollah’s clear preference being an Islamist system.65 The 
2009 Manifesto meanwhile provides a more refined and mature view of the world, although 
several of its underlying views remain unchanged.66 For example, rather than referring to 
the West as evil, Hezbollah criticizes U.S. hegemony and the negative impact that 
globalization has had on Muslims.67 The 2009 Manifesto also emphasizes the importance 
of its regional allies, primarily Syria and Iran. 
The 1985 Open Letter calls for the establishment of an Islamic state modelled after 
the Iranian system. This includes not just the incorporation of Islamic principles into the 
political system but the rule of Islamic jurist-theologian as well.68 These ideas were 
abandoned in practice by the late-1980s however, and were officially dropped in the 2009 
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Manifesto.69 Making no reference to any issues with political participation or an Islamic 
state, the 2009 Manifesto instead calls for a “political system that truly represents the will 
of the people.”70 Now participating in the Lebanese political system, Hezbollah’s political 
platforms have emphasized economic rights, social justice, human rights, improved status 
and representation for Lebanese Shia, and the incorporation of Islamic-based reform into 
legislation.71 
Historically, the fight against Israel and Zionism has been Hezbollah’s primary 
reason for existing. The fight fuels Hezbollah’s narrative and it thrives on any conflict with 
Israel.72 Its efforts against Israel have widened its base and provided it legitimacy in 
Lebanon, even among non-Shia. While Hezbollah has toned down its rhetoric regarding 
the destruction of the Israeli state and instead focuses on the rights of Palestinians and 
changing Israel from within, Hezbollah today remains fully opposed to any negotiated 
agreement between Arabs and Israel.73 
D. STRENGTH OF STATE GOVERNMENT 
Due to the civil war, Lebanon was considered a failed and collapsed state 
throughout the 1980s and a weak state after Syrian intervention in 1990.74 Municipal 
elections were not held in Lebanon for 35 years, which led to a decline in financial, 
technical, and human capacity, and decimated institutions for governance and public good 
provision. This was exacerbated by the neglect of Lebanon’s state government, both during 
and after its civil war.75 Conditions were especially poor in Lebanon’s rural areas and the 
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southern suburb of Beirut as the state government focused its efforts in Beirut’s urban 
areas.  
It is in such weak states that groups like Hezbollah are able to exist. As Tamara 
Coffman Wittes argues, “only regimes with insufficient capacity to enforce their monopoly 
on violence and with weakened legitimacy for their governance and political institutions 
are compelled to allow such compromised groups to participate in politics with their 
weapons in hand.”76 In stronger states, like Egypt and Jordan, armed groups are typically 
suppressed by the central government.77 Furthermore, the citizens of weak states generally 
have little faith that their government can provide for their security and welfare, and often 
turn to community-based organizations like Hezbollah.78 
Lebanon’s status as a weak state is a primary reason why Hezbollah and its armed-
wing are able to exist, despite the group’s demonstrated ability to challenge Lebanon’s 
monopoly of violence.79 Lebanon has proven itself incapable of projecting itself in the 
areas where Hezbollah operates—a lack of sovereign control which points to its failed 
status.80 Moreover, Lebanon’s status as a weak state also explains the level of foreign 
intervention in the country, as both Israel and Syria maintained a recurring military 
presence in the country, and Syria maintained a heavy hand in Lebanese political decisions 
until 2005.81 
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E. TERRITORIAL CONTROL 
Hezbollah began operating out of the Bekaa Valley in the early 1980s before 
expanding to the heavily-Shia areas in southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs.82 
Hezbollah operates with three local councils, with one in each of these regions.83 It acts as 
the de facto government in those areas where the state government has little access or 
capability.84 While Hezbollah does not limit its services to non-Shia in its areas of 
operations, Hezbollah operates primarily in areas that are majority Shia (depicted in Figure 
1) due to the extremely sectarian nature of Lebanon.85 
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Figure 1.  Religious composition of Lebanon.86 
While Hezbollah has never indicated a desire to create a separate or autonomous state 
from the Lebanese government, Hezbollah nevertheless maintains such strong control in its 
territories that the Lebanese police is known to lack any authority in these areas.87 Hezbollah 
flags can be spotted frequently throughout its territory, along with displays of Shia cleric 
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Muqtada al-Sadr and Iran’s Ayatollah Kkomeini, and Hezbollah is the largest employer in 
Beirut’s southern suburbs.88 Many of those in Hezbollah’s territory are distrustful of the 
central government, viewing themselves as separate from the north and center of country. 
Due to its social programs and resistance against Israel, Hezbollah has garnered deep loyalty 
and attacahment from its constituents since the early 1980s.89 Even if the Lebanese 
government and military were more capable, it would face a tough task trying to disqualify 
Hezbollah from politics due to its popularity and standing in Lebanese society.90 
Due to Lebanon’s inability to confront Hezbollah, the government has had little 
choice but to enter an unspoken “gentleman’s agreement of sorts” to “stay out of Hezbollah’s 
way in these areas”—so long as the group does not interfere with the government’s economic 
considerations.91 Although not an ideal situation, Hezbollah’s social services program has 
also relieved heavy social pressures on the government.92 However, by ceding soverign 
control of these areas to Hezbollah, the government continues to demonstrate its status as a 
weak state unable to fully control its own territory.93 
After Israel left southern Lebanon in May 2000, the Lebanese government did not 
send forces to the area and instead gave Hezbollah its blessing to take control of the territory 
and secure the Israeli border.94 Although Hezbollah now respects the Lebanese 
government’s legitimacy in many respects, Hezbollah and the Lebanese government issued 
a joint claim regarding Israeli’s presence in the Shebaa Farms, which they stated was a 
violation of UN Resolution 425 and an occupation of Lebanese territory.95 Although the 
issue is far from settled, the joint issuance of the claim indicates that the Lebanese 
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government respects Hezbollah’s position of authority in these territories and on issues 
regarding Israel. 
F. FUNDING 
Hezbollah’s most significant source of revenue and funding is Iran, a fact that 
Hezbollah is open about. Motivated by its desire to export the Islamic Revolution and support 
the fight against Israel,96 estimates for Iran’s support to Hezbollah’s projects and social 
services program range from $200 million to over $1 billion annually. This figure does not 
include Iran’s military assistance to Hezbollah, which is believed to be even greater than its 
non-military assistance.97 The majority of these funds come not through Iran’s government 
or president, but through charitable organizations and foundations overseen by Supreme 
Leader Ali Khamenei. Additional funds are provided by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
Corps (IRGC) and intelligence services, which also fall under Khamenei’s authority.98 Iran’s 
long-standing support was critical to the foundation and rise of Hezbollah. In 1982, for 
example, Iran provided funds, weapons, and fifteen hundred IRGC fighters to train and 
support Hezbollah.99 
A second major source of funding is from khums, a one-fifth tax required by Shia 
jurisprudence which represents a form of zakat, or charity.100 While statistics on these are 
unknown, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah claims that “the funds are big, 
important, and they are spent on jihad, educational, social, and cultural affairs.”101 
Hezbollah also receives donations from businesses, charities, and individuals in 
Lebanon and throughout the world.102 Although donations to Hezbollah are illegal in the 
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United States, donations are legal throughout much of the world, as few states label 
Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.103 Even states with strict anti-terrorism laws generally 
recognize the distinction between Hezbollah’s armed wing and its social programs. 
Hezbollah’s last major source of revenue comes from its global investments and 
business operations. Some of these operations are legal and legitimate, such as a commercial 
network that includes supermarkets, construction companies, and department stores.104 
Others are highly illegal, including its involvement in Africa’s diamond trade and its 
operations in a South American region known as the Tri-Border Area where Hezbollah is 
reportedly involved in drug smuggling, and gun running.105 Hezbollah has even been linked 
to two cigarette smuggling rings in the United States where profits were sent to Lebanon in 
support of the group.106 
G. USE OF VIOLENCE 
Hezbollah rose to global notoriety as a terrorist organization in the 1980s following 
its attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983, which killed 63 people, and the 
October 1983 bombings of the Multinational Force barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 
Americans and 58 French paratroopers.107 Although Hezbollah generally ended kidnappings 
and terrorist attacks on foreigners within Lebanon after its second civil war (1975-1990), it 
continued international attacks throughout the 1990s, primarily targeting Jewish and Israeli 
interests.108 
In addition to terrorist attacks, Hezbollah has used violence and military means to 
achieve its goals in several instances since its creation: against other Lebanese militias during 
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the civil war, against Israeli forces and non-combatants during Israel’s occupation of 
southern Lebanon, against Israel in the 2006 war, and lastly against its political opponents in 
Lebanon in 2008.109 Hezbollah’s targeted violence against Lebanese factions was limited to 
militia forces, although its attacks against foreign targets included both combatants and non-
combatants. Hezbollah’s use of violence against Israel prior to 2006 was done to continue its 
resistance efforts and its acts were specifically calculated to force Israel out of Lebanese 
territory. Since 2006, Hezbollah has not used force against Israel (in compliance with cease-
fire agreements) but did use limited levels of violence within Lebanon in 2008.110 In May 
2008, after over a year of major political deadlock, violence erupted the streets of Beirut 
between the Hezbollah-led March 8 alliance and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and his pro-
government March 14 alliance.111 Sparked by a government effort to shut down a 
Hezbollah-operated communications network, Hezbollah seized control of parts of the 
capital, blocking roads and engaging in shootouts that left several dead.112 Separately, 
Hezbollah is also believed to be responsible for the 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri (father 
of current Prime Minister Saad Hariri).113 
Two reasons for Hezbollah’s general lack of violence against Lebanese civilians have 
been a stated reluctance to kill fellow Muslims and a recognition that political, rather than 
violent, behavior strengthens Hezbollah’s public perception and improves its political clout. 
Although Hezbollah has attacked Muslims in the past, it ended its terrorist attacks within 
Lebanon in the early 1990s and is primarily focused on countering the United States, Israel, 
and other Western states.114  
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According to Joseph Nye, “the current struggle is not only about whose army wins, 
but also whose story wins.”115 Hezbollah is well aware of the importance of public 
perception and regularly use the media to mobilize support, recruit, and influence the 
opponent’s perception of the conflict. For instance, Hezbollah is aware of Israeli sensitivity 
to casualties and often records videos and pictures of attacks on IDF soldiers to influence 
Israeli society.116 
Although some assert that Hezbollah will eventually shift away from its violent 
tactics entirely, this is not necessarily certain, as terrorist groups who halt violence do not 
always do so permanently.117 A core element of Hezbollah’s identity has been its armed 
protection of the Lebanese and Palestinian people, and it views its military activities as 
central to its organization—even in times of peace. Hezbollah maintains its military arm and 
right to force in part because eliminating those aspects would itself eliminate a core source 
of identity for Hezbollah.118 Furthermore, studies have shown that while 67 percent of 
Lebanese Shia would oppose Hezbollah’s use of violence to achieve the its own objectives, 
54 percent believe that Hezbollah should maintain “the right to use violence against the 
state.”119 Additionally, 80 percent of Lebanese Shia support the military aspects of 
Hezbollah. 
H. USE OF GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC GOODS 
While many see Hezbollah as strictly a terrorist organization, others see Hezbollah 
as a legitimate political party in Lebanon that provides a robust social services program. 
Other scholars emphasize Hezbollah’s role as a hybrid terrorist organization that maintains 
a robust paramilitary organization, social services program, and political organization.120 
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Although Hezbollah maintains its armed wing, despite calls to disarm, the group today is 
primarily focused on its active involvement in Lebanese politics.121 
Due to the weak state of the Lebanese government during the civil war, it was unable 
to provide basic services across the country, ranging from water distribution and health 
services to electricity and garbage removal.122 Additionally, many of the social services and 
welfare programs provided by the government and other actors are patronage-based, 
meaning that members’ families and party supporters were prioritized.123 
Hezbollah’s work providing services and filling the role as the de facto government 
therefore began as early as 1983 and was buttressed by Iranian support beginning in 1984.124 
Hezbollah quickly become known among the people of Lebanon, and particularly among 
Shia, as a movement dedicated and committed to the poor.125 Small-scale forms of 
assistance, such as food and cash, are frequently given out in its early years. Although 
Hezbollah provides services to non-Shia, Lebanese Shia make up the primary beneficiaries 
due to the fact that Hezbollah operates in Shia-dominated areas.126 
Although many assumed the Lebanese government would resume providing services 
following the end of the civil war, Hezbollah has instead maintained responsibility in their 
territory. These services are widely considered by the NGO community to be highly efficient 
and superior to the services of the government and other organizations.127 For example, in 
the months after Israel’s 2006 attacks in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah had spent an estimated 
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$281 million in compensation and rehabilitation, compared to just $21 million spent by the 
Lebanese government.128 Today, Hezbollah provides services to an estimated 200,000 to 
350,000 Lebanese citizens, which is as high as 10 percent of the entire country.129 
Headquartered in Beirut’s southern suburbs, Hezbollah’s social services program is 
divided into the Education Unit, Social Unit, and Islamic Health Unit (as depicted in Figure 
2).130 Many of Hezbollah’s smaller service organizations are registered as Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO) with the Lebanese government and regularly work with 
other local and international organizations.131 
 
Figure 2.  Hezbollah’s social services breakdown132 
Hezbollah’s Education Unit is a vital organization for Lebanon’s poor Shia 
population. Lebanon’s public school system is considered very low quality and is a last 
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resort for poor families who are unable to afford private schools.133 Hezbollah operates 
schools for approximately 14,000 students for fees at a third of the cost for typical private 
schools.134 Hezbollah also provides scholarships and books for its poorest students, 
operates libraries, and even has computers and modern technology often found in Western 
countries.135 
The Social Unit consists of four organizations: Jihad Construction Foundation, the 
Foundation for the Wounded, the Khomeini Support Committee, and the Martyr’s 
Foundation. The Jihad Construction Foundation is one of the most significant NGOs in 
Lebanon, which works to repair homes and buildings damaged from war with Israel, 
maintains roads, and ensures access to water and sanitation.136 Following Israeli attacks in 
southern Lebanon in 1996, Hezbollah reported that it rebuilt 5,000 homes throughout 82 
villages (which outside observers believe is accurate), in addition to other road and 
infrastructure repairs.137 The Martyr’s Foundation provides financial support to the 
families of Hezbollah fighters who die in combat, while the Foundation of the Wounded 
gives aid to civilians injured by conflict with Israel.138 Following the 2006 war with Israel, 
Hezbollah provided displaced people with food, water, shelter, and compensation to those 
whose homes were destroyed.139 
Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Unit provides healthcare to poor Lebanese citizens for 
little to no cost. It operates three hospitals, 20 dental clinics, 20 infirmaries, and 12 health 
centers. According to interviews, the Islamic Health Unit was so effective that it took over 
the operation of several government hospitals in the Bekaa Valley and Southern 
                                                 
133 Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 126. 
134 Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 126; Prusher, “Through Charity, Hezbollah Charms Lebanon.” 
135 Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 126; Prusher, “Through Charity, Hezbollah Charms Lebanon.” 
136 Gleis and Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas a Comparative Study, 67; Trofimov, “U.S. Finds it Hard to 
Tag Hezbollah As a Terrorist Group”; Wiegand, Bombs and Ballots, 120. 
137 Usher, “Hizballah, Syria, and the Lebanese Elections,” 64. 
138 Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” 125; Gleis and Berti, Hezbollah and 
Hamas a Comparative Study, 68; Wiegand, 120. 
139 Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” 127. 
28 
Lebanon.140 The Islamic Health Unit helps pay for medical care, both in Lebanon and 
abroad, and offers free health insurance and prescription-drugs through a local pharmacy 
network.141 Interviews with those living in Hezbollah territory attest to their ability to 
deliver services ranging from providing Caesarean sections to paying for heart surgery.142 
Additionally, Hezbollah staff members have also stated that during times of war, they will 
go into dangerous areas to assist refugees and injured civilians even when other NGOs, 
such as the Red Cross, will not.143 
Hezbollah has also run a robust communications program since the 1980s, complete 
with a newspaper, multiple radio stations, and a television station.144 It has also assumed 
responsibility for many typical state government functions, including water delivery, 
garbage collection, waste management, and many other basic needs.145 
Hezbollah has overtaken important clan-mediating roles previously filled by 
Lebanese state officials and clan political leaders.146 It has operated these mediations using 
tribal traditions and Islamic law, including mediations regarding murder, and operates 
outside the Lebanese legal system. In instances where a legal suit has been filed with the 
Lebanese legal system, the suit is dropped once reconciliation has been completed. 
Although not a robust example of governance, it demonstrates Hezbollah’s ability to 
perform functions typically reserved for central governments. 
Hezbollah’s work providing public goods, which it incorporates into its 
parliamentary platform, has gained the organization a great deal of support as a political 
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party.147 In a survey regarding educational, social, and health services, 64 percent of 
Lebanese Shia participants stated that Hezbollah provided more services than any other 
entity in Lebanon, and 72 percent of poor participants stated that their political preference 
was Hezbollah.148 Other studies have also shown high levels of support among very 
religious Shia.149 Heartfelt or not, it is clear that constituents in Hezbollah-controlled areas 
regularly demonstrate their loyalty to Hezbollah in elections.150 
Hezbollah’s commitment to providing public goods and services has remained 
consistent over time. Against a background of competing groups that provided goods and 
services themselves, social welfare was a priority for Hezbollah early on.151 As its social 
welfare program developed throughout the 1980s, it quickly reached robust levels in just a 
few years.152 Its commitment to social welfare and public goods has remained steady since 
its foundation, in part due to reoccurring conflict with Israel and the resulting wartime 
damages in addition to its involvement in electoral politics and its subsequent need to court 
the support of Shia and non-Shia voters. 
I. EXPLANATIONS 
The decision to provide public goods and governance rather than solely committing 
violence against a population is likely a complex relationship of multiple factors. This 
section, however, will analyze how the Hezbollah case study appears to fit within the 
hypotheses laid out in the introductory chapter. It will examine the correlations that do or 
do not support the hypotheses in addition to comparing the Hezbollah case study with 
AQAP and Hamas. 
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H1: Territorial security and legitimacy are significant factors behind insurgents’ 
decision and ability to provide governance and public goods to their constituents. 
Historical observations of Lebanon indicate that is likely true for Hezbollah. While 
many non-state actors, including religious groups and secular NGOs, provide assistance 
and services within Lebanon, this is especially true among political actors. Notably, in 
Lebanon’s civil war (1975-1990), the four major armed political groups (Hezbollah, the 
Lebanese Forces, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the Progressive Socialist 
Party) involved all provided public goods to the constituents within their territories.153 
Although Hezbollah is now unique in its status as the only armed non-state group in 
Lebanon, its role as an armed group providing public goods within its territory remains 
consistent with other recent armed groups that controlled territory in Lebanon. Even in its 
current role as a participant in Lebanese politics, Hezbollah continues to provide public 
goods to constituents in their territory in exchange for support. 
Hezbollah is therefore similar to Hamas in the Gaza Strip and AQAP in Yemen as 
all three maintained elements of territorial control. 
H2: Secessionist rebel groups are more likely to provide governance and public 
goods to their constituents than non-secessionist groups. 
Although Hezbollah controls territory at the expense of the central government and 
was vocally opposed the entire Lebanese political system in the past, it is clearly a non-
secessionist group that also provides extensive public goods. Rather than seeking to 
maintain control of its territory and achieve a level of autonomy or independence from the 
central government, it instead works actively within Lebanon’s political system to achieve 
its goals. The Hezbollah case study therefore does not provide support to this hypothesis. 
Hezbollah is therefore similar to AQAP in this regard but different from Hamas, 
which seeks sovereignty and independence from Israel. 
H3: Rebel groups that exist in weak states are likely to provide governance and 
public goods to their constituents.  
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It is undeniable that Lebanon has been a historically weak state, particularly during 
the civil war. Hezbollah has thrived in these areas since its creation and the central 
government has been unable to counter the strength of Hezbollah in the group’s territory. 
Hezbollah and the Lebanese state therefore appear to provide support for this hypothesis. 
Compared to AQAP and Hamas, Hezbollah is unique in terms of the strength of its 
state opposition. AQAP exists in Yemen, a failed state, and Hamas is opposed to Israel, a 
strong state with a powerful military. Lebanon, meanwhile, was a failed state during the 
1980s and 1990s and is now a recovering failed state—but a weak state nonetheless. This 
hypothesis therefore provides three unique positions on the spectrum of weak state to 
strong state. 
H4: Rebel groups with greater overall capability are more likely to provide 
governance and public goods to their constituents than groups with moderate to weak 
capability. 
Hezbollah has demonstrated an impressive level of funding for its military and 
social services programs. The quality of these programs is praised by NGOs throughout 
the region and the group still maintains a robust military capability capable of waging 
medium-intensity warfare.154 Primarily supported by Iran among other sources, 
Hezbollah’s funding is estimated to be as high as several billions of dollars annually, 
allowing them the flexibility to provide extensive public goods and services in addition to 
their military capabilities. The Hezbollah case study therefore provides support for this 
hypothesis. 
Hezbollah clearly has greater funding than either Hamas or AQAP. Hamas has an 
annual budget as high as $150 million annually, while AQAP’s war chest is believed to 
have peaked at about $100 million—far lower than Hamas.155 
  
                                                 
154 Gleis and Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas a Comparative Study, 82–84; Wiegand, Bombs and Ballots, 
98. 
155 Associated Press, “Al-Qaeda Seizes Large Weapons Cache in Eastern Yemen,” Washington Post, 
April 17, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/al-qaeda-seizes-large-weapons-cache-
in-eastern-yemen/2015/04/17/9f1d9eb0-e53c-11e4-905f-cc896d379a32_story.html; Khaled Hroub, Hamas: 
A Beginners Guide. 
32 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
33 
III. HAMAS CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Like Hezbollah and AQAP, Hamas is a complicated organization. It has been 
locked in an ongoing conflict with Israel since its creation in 1987 and has utilized terrorist 
tactics against the Israeli military and its citizens. Hamas also uses violence against its main 
political opponent and has curtailed the rights and liberties of its constituents. This use of 
violence, however, has generally been strategically used in pragmatic and rational ways. 
Hamas has also long been committed to the security and welfare of Palestinians. It 
has funded hospitals, taken care of orphans, sponsored schools, and given meals to the 
needy. It engages in democratic elections and is supportive of liberal-democratic 
institutions and free enterprise. 
This case study will discuss the history of Hamas and examine how these strategies 
play out and coexist with one another. It will also examine how this case study fits into the 
hypotheses listed in the first chapter and how they compare with Hezbollah and AQAP. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Hamas emerged in December 1987 during the outbreak of the First Intifada (1987-
1993) between Palestinians and Israel.156 Hamas was created as a paramilitary wing under 
the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, which was itself rooted in the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood. Although it was formed as a purely militant group due to domestic pressure 
on the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood to engage Israel with force, Hamas was largely 
autonomous of its parent organization and quickly expanded into the political realm.157 
Before the end of the First Intifada, Hamas overtook the Muslim Brotherhood as the most 
influential Islamist political movement in the Palestinian territories and gradually coopted 
                                                 
156 Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington: Institute for Palestine 
Studies, 2000), 36–41. 
157 Gleis and Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas a Comparative Study, 119; Krista E. Wiegand, Bombs and 
Ballots, 125–127. 
34 
much of its parent organization.158 In line with its Muslim Brotherhood roots, Hamas is an 
Islamist and Palestinian nationalist group, which differentiates it from its primary domestic 
rivals, the PLO umbrella group and it strongest contingent, Fatah, which are purely 
secular.159 
With the signing of the initial Oslo Accords in 1993, Yasser Arafat and the PLO 
successfully negotiated a set of peace agreements with Israel and ended the First 
Intifada.160 The agreements created the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), also known 
as the Palestinian Authority (PA), which was an interim government with limited powers 
over parts of the Palestinian territories—in cooperation with the Israeli government.161 
Although verbally opposed to the PA and the Oslo Accords, Hamas refrained from 
attacking or undermining the PA in Gaza in the year following the agreement.162 After the 
1994 Hebron Massacre, however, in which an Israeli settler left 29 Palestinians dead and 
125 injured, Hamas quickly ramped up its attacks against Israel and its citizens.163 These 
attacks, which undermined the PA’s agreement and authority, escalated throughout the 
1990s and included kidnappings, rockets, ambushes, and most notably suicide 
bombings.164 In response, Israel and the PA instituted a major crackdown on Hamas and 
Gaza which contributed to worsening on the ground conditions for Gazans.165 Hamas also 
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led the Palestinian resistance against Israel during the Second Intifada (2000-2005), which 
resulted in increased Palestinian support for Hamas and coincided with the deteriorating 
image of Fatah and the PLO due to corruption, poor governance and service provision, and 
an inability to make progress in achieving a long-term peace settlement with Israel.166 
As Hamas absorbed Muslim Brotherhood institutions during its initial years of 
operation, it became increasingly involved in social welfare and building grassroots 
support167—traits that echo the priorities of Hamas’s Muslim Brotherhood roots.168 From 
healthcare and education to orphanages and an efficient justice system, Hamas has 
diligently provided services to Gaza’s 1.8 million residents since the 1990s. Providing 
these services was key to building Hamas’s support base and legitimacy and allowed 
Hamas to keep in touch with the needs and desires of the Palestinian people.169 Although 
not initially involved in Palestinian-wide elections, Hamas created its Political Bureau in 
1992 and began competing with and defeating Fatah candidates in municipal elections, 
university student unions, professional associations, and chamber of commerce boards. 
After growing internal pressure, Hamas launched its own official political party in March 
1996.170 
In addition to the decreasing popularity of Fatah and the death of Yasser Arafat in 
2004, the end of the Second Intifada and Israel’s subsequent withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip created a promising environment for Hamas’s political future.171 Hamas took 77 of 
Gaza’s 118 seats in the 2005 municipal elections followed by 74 of 132 seats in the 2006 
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Palestinian-wide legislative elections—enough to beat out Fatah for the largest bloc.172 
International isolation, led by the United States and Israel, quickly followed Hamas’s 
democratic victory.173 When Fatah then refused to share control of the Palestinian 
government with Hamas, fighting broke out between the two organizations resulting in the 
brief 2007 Battle of Gaza. Hamas’s victory led to its takeover of Gaza and Fatah’s creation 
of a separate, parallel government in the West Bank in June 2007.174 Despite numerous 
attempts at reconciliation (including an October 2017 agreement),175 no reconciliation 
frameworks or agreements between Fatah and Hamas have resulted in meaningful change 
or unification.176 
Notably, over the course of its history, Hamas has balanced its ideological roots 
and long-term vision with its commitment to Palestinian’s well-being and political 
pragmatism.177 It has engaged in numerous attacks (including 2008–2009, 2012, and 2014) 
and cease-fires with Israel, largely based on pragmatic cost-benefit analysis and an 
awareness of popular opinion.178 At various times, Hamas has indicated that it would be 
willing to approve of an interim solution for peace with Israel and no longer directly states 
its unwillingness to officially recognize Israel.179 Similarly, after violent clashes and 
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political standoffs, on-and-off cooperation with Fatah has been motivated by Palestinian 
public opinion and short-term political gain rather than a serious change of position.180 
Overall, Hamas has painted itself as a hard to define and hard to predict organization, 
constantly balancing its ideological commitment with pragmatic moderation and public 
opinion.181 
Despite its engagement in governance and social services, Hamas’s opposition to 
Israel and use of terrorist tactics have put it at odds with the international community. 
Hamas is designation as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States Department 
of State and has faced international pressure and sanctions since the 1990s.182 Since its 
2006 legislative election success and 2007 takeover of Gaza, Hamas has faced increased 
international isolation while its main rival, Fatah, has received cooperation and support 
from the United States and Israel.183 
C. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
Hamas’s official and original goals can be traced back to the 1988 Charter of the 
Islamic Resistance Movement.184 The charter clearly states Hamas’s goal of creating an 
Islamic state in all of historic Palestine and to restructure Palestinian society according to 
sharia.185 It strongly associates itself with the Muslim Brotherhood and clearly identifies 
nationalism and Islamism as the pillars of its ideology.186 It seeks the elimination of the 
state of Israel and declares that there is no solution for Palestine other than through 
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jihad.187 As such, it has long been opposed to Fatah’s cooperation with Israel and was an 
outspoken critic of the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords.188 
Despite its clearly stated ideology and original list of goals, Hamas has strayed from 
the 1988 charter in practice. Early statements regarding the goal of creating an Islamic state 
never gained serious traction189 and, most importantly, its negotiations and short-term 
agreements with Israel have indicated a de facto acceptance of an Israeli state.190 
Following Hamas’s 2006 legislative election success, senior leader Mousa Abu Marzook 
stated that “we cannot recognize Israel” but that “relations with the Jewish State are 
inevitable as the existence of Israel is a fact” and that “Hamas may recognize Israel’s 
legitimacy, under certain conditions” to include a return to the 1967 borders and the right 
of return for Palestinian refugees.191 Far from an official position or a change to its charter, 
various Hamas leaders have repeatedly echoed these sentiments since the 1990s. Hamas 
has also often stated that it is willing to achieve its goals in stages, specifically in the form 
of an “interim solution” that establishes peace based on the 1967 borders rather than only 
its long-term goal, or “historic solution,” that liberates all of historic Palestine and forms 
an Islamic state.192 Acceptance of an “interim solution” became more official in early 2017 
when Hamas issued a “Political Document” stating that it would accept peace based on the 
1967 borders and the right of return.193 
In addition to Hamas’s long commitment to the social welfare of Palestinians, its 
government platform has emphasized democratic ideals, including separate judicial, 
legislative, and executive branches; checks and balances; and guaranteed rights and 
freedoms. This was reiterated in March 2006 by Prime Minister Ismail Haniya who stated 
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that Hamas’s political goals included the resistance against Israeli occupation, safety and 
security for Palestinians, relieving economic hardships, financial and administrative 
reform, pluralism, and the peaceful rotation of power.194 Despite a poor track record 
promoting democratic institutions since taking over Gaza, these remain Hamas’s official 
and broad political objectives.195 
D. STRENGTH OF STATE GOVERNMENT 
Due to Palestine’s lack of statehood and the fact that Israel exerts considerable 
external and internal influence on Palestine, this section will specifically examine the 
strength of Israel in regard to Gaza and the West Bank. The following section, covering 
territorial control, will focus on Hamas’s control within Gaza. 
According to Krista Weigand, Palestine is best described as a pseudo-weak state 
since it is itself extremely weak but not officially a state.196 Israel, however, is far from a 
weak state. As an outside power (or occupying force according to Palestinians and the 
United Nations), Israel held a military presence in Gaza until 2005 and currently maintains 
firm security control of over 80 percent of the West Bank.197 It has long been involved in 
Palestinian politics, mainly through its cooperation and coordination with Fatah and the 
PA after the 1993 Oslo Accords, and has worked closely with the United States and 
international community to exert pressure and enforce sanctions on Palestine—and 
specifically on Gaza and Hamas.198 In addition to leading international sanctions, Israel 
has enacted a crippling blockade and withheld tax revenues from being redistributed back 
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into Gaza.199 With the backing of Israel and the United States, Fatah and the PA have also 
joined in targeting Hamas, to include restricting critical goods and medical supplies from 
entering Gaza and withholding pay for Palestinian government officials who work in 
Gaza.200 
The active role of Israel has gradually weakened Hamas and has considerably 
constrained its opportunities for growth and its ability to provide for Palestinians201 (but 
has also created significant Palestinian animosity and greater support for Hamas and its 
resistance efforts).202 Israel is also a far superior military power that has the backing of the 
United States, which further limits Hamas’s ability to wage a long-term, successful 
resistance campaign through militant means. Despite their territorial control, Hamas has 
been powerless to stop these sanctions from crippling the Gazan economy and creating 
mass poverty and unemployment.203 
E. TERRITORIAL CONTROL 
Although Hamas and Palestine have been engaged in a decades-long fight for 
sovereignty and are largely helpless to the strength of Israel and the international 
community, Hamas has maintained strong influence in Gaza since the mid-1990s and a 
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total monopoly on the use of force after 2007.204 After 2007, Hamas invested heavily in 
its al-Qassam Brigade “rebel forces” and in Gaza’s institutional security sector.205 As of 
2014, 15,000 of Hamas’s 40,000 employees were involved in the security sector. Hamas’s 
territorial control and monopoly of force are further evidenced by the significant reduction 
in crime after 2007 and by Hamas’s strict crackdown against Fatah leaders and members. 
Additionally, after 2007, the al-Qassam Brigade continued its gradual evolution into a 
skilled, quasi-army and has achieved unclear level of autonomy from Hamas leadership.206 
F. FUNDING 
Specifics on Hamas’s funding are difficult to ascertain and estimates range widely, 
from $70 million–$150 million annually.207 Despite this uncertainly, it is well established 
that Hamas has developed an integrated and complex financial system, combing funding 
from private donors, foreign states, charities, and internal taxation.208 While Hamas goes 
to great lengths to make it appear that its military funding is separate from charitable 
donations, the reality is that the separation of these funds are entirely unclear.209 That said, 
the vast majority of funding goes to social services while the military receives the smallest 
share.210  
Since the early 1990s, Hamas has received the majority of its funding from outside 
sources, particularly foreign states.211 Countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have 
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all been known to provide funding to the group.212 As early as 1992, Iran had pledged $30 
million to Hamas annually in addition to providing Hamas with weapons and military 
training from the IRGC. This support was vital to the early rise of Hamas as an alternative 
to Fatah and the PLO.213 In April 2006, Iran pledged $50 million annually and increased 
its pledge to $120 million in December 2006. 
Hamas also raises money through zakat, or charity, (which is one of the five pillars 
of Islam) both locally and internationally.214 Hamas utilizes foreign charities, such as 
Interpal and al-Aqsa International, for donations—many of which are direct fronts for 
Hamas.215 These foreign organizations have faced increased pressure from the United 
States and the United Nations, which have strengthened its laws and enforcement 
mechanisms to prohibit donations from reaching designated terrorist organizations like 
Hamas.216 Despite pressure on these groups, Hamas raises an estimated $15 million–$20 
million through foreign charities annually.217  
In addition to local charities that raise money through zakat, Hamas has self-funded 
locally by way of tax collection on companies in Gaza and on goods smuggled in through 
tunnels. It also collects customs duties on legally imported goods, institutes fines, and 
charges nominal fees for the services it provides.218 
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G. USE OF VIOLENCE 
Historically, Hamas’s use of violence has been primarily aimed at Israel and there 
has existed an undeniable degree of anti-Semitism within the organization.219 Hamas was 
originally established as the militant wing of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood before 
becoming autonomous and overtaking it as the dominant Islamic organization in Palestine. 
Hamas was active throughout the First Intifada and formed its own military wing, the Izz 
al-Din Qassam Brigades, in 1991.220 Prior to 1993, Hamas had a policy of controlled 
violence against Israel and did not target Israeli civilians.221 Following the Oslo Accords 
and Hebron Massacre, however, Hamas began to actively use terrorist and guerilla tactics 
against both Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and civilian non-combatants.222 Hamas’s attacks 
included kidnappings, roadside bombs, shootings, knife attacks, and suicide bombings.223 
While suicide bombings were used heavily from 1994 to 1997 and especially during the 
Second Intifada, rocket attacks have been far more common since 2005.224  
The use of violence against the average Palestinian citizen has been almost non-
existent. While Hamas has instituted codes of conduct in Gaza, it has used a non-coercive 
strategy that enforced conduct with little more than reprimands or public condemnation for 
non-conformers.225 In instances where violence has occurred, including the 2005 killing 
of a Palestinian woman by Hamas’s “vice and virtue” police, Hamas distanced itself from 
those involved and stated that the perpetrators were acting on their own without orders 
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from Hamas.226 Hamas’s leadership has stated that they do not believe an Islamic state can 
be brought about by force but only through the will of the majority of Palestinians.227 This 
explains Hamas’s emphasis on social services and governance to attract public support 
rather than relying on coercive means. It is important to note, however, that since taking 
over Gaza, Hamas has blended democratic and authoritarian governance.228 Since 2006, 
Hamas has not strengthened democratic norms within Gaza as promised but rather has 
ruled with little concern for civil liberties and human rights outside of its public 
declarations.229 
While Hamas has not utilized violence against the average Palestinian citizen, it 
has used force repeatedly against its political opposition, namely Fatah.230 The use of force 
against Fatah was most notable during the 2007 Battle of Gaza, in which violent fighting 
led to Hamas’s successful takeover of Gaza. Before and after that conflict, however, Hamas 
has been criticized for human rights violations in its actions against Fatah members and 
leaders, which include arbitrary detentions and unlawful killings.231 It has also looted the 
office buildings, places of business, and homes of Fatah officials; been accused of torturing 
detained Fatah members; closed all Fatah run charities and organizations; and instituted 
widespread censorship against Fatah media outlets.232  
Following Hamas’s 2006 legislative election success, splinter Salafi-jihadi 
opposition groups gained prevalence in Gaza.233 Overall, Hamas has utilized a carrot and 
stick approach to dealing with Salafi-jihadists, which has included the use of violent force 
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in several instances, resulting in multiple deaths as well as damage to a mosque and several 
homes.234 In recent years, however, Hamas has focused on containing Salafi-jihadist 
opposition rather than on eliminating it.235 These efforts have included particular emphasis 
on mediation, de-radicalization programs, and counter-radicalization programs. 
Overall, Hamas has not used violence as a means in and of itself but rather as a way 
to achieve specific goals.236 Whether against Fatah or Israel, Hamas has been driven by a 
pragmatic cost-benefit analysis of violence and by an awareness of Palestinian public 
opinion.237 Throughout its history, Hamas has utilized different methods of violence at 
different times, depending on the political conditions.238 Furthermore, when Hamas has 
determined that violence was counter-productive to achieving its goals or to maintaining 
popular support it has agreed to multiple cease-fire agreements with Israel.239 
H. USE OF GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC GOODS 
The Hamas organization is controlled by two main bodies: The Advisory (or Shura) 
Council and the Political Bureau.240 The Advisory Council is senior, made up of about 60 
leaders both inside and outside of Gaza, and is the main decision maker for significant 
political and strategic decisions.241 The Political Bureau acts as the executive body by 
overseeing lower-level and day-to-day operations.242 The Political Bureau is in charge of 
Hamas’s security forces, finances, and social welfare programs. 
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Hamas entered the political arena in 1992 after the Political Bureau was established, 
enabling it to participate in municipal elections, professional elections, and university 
student unions243—which attracted even more support than from mosques.244 Hamas’s 
leaders claimed that participation in politics was another method for meeting the needs of 
Palestinians and for its struggle against Israel.245 
As the Second Intifada came to an end, Hamas shifted from a military focus to a 
political focus in order to ensure long-term integration in Palestinian society. Capitalizing 
on the weakness of Fatah at the time, due both to Fatah’s low popularity and the death of 
Yasser Arafat, Hamas ran in the 2005 municipal elections and in the 2006 legislative 
elections.246 In addition to its criticism of Fatah, Hamas ran on a platform promoting 
justice and equality, capitalism and free enterprise, helping the poor, curbing monopolies, 
and strong liberal democratic principles to include pluralism, checks and balances, and the 
peaceful rotation of power.247 Hamas’s surprising victory in 2006 was also the result of 
years of building grassroots-level support, Fatah corruption, and the perceived failures of 
Fatah’s governance and peace efforts with Israel.248 
Since taking over Gaza in 2007, however, Hamas’s mixed track record at 
governance falls short of its stated platform. In its first year in power, Gaza did successfully 
legislate, to include passing bills, approving budgets, and overhauling the judicial system 
to improve its efficiency and effectiveness.249 It was also able to end to the chaotic security 
situation in Gaza, restore law and order, and even worked with the Fatah government in 
Ramallah on specific issues such as improving education and importing essential goods 
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and health supplies.250 Hamas, however, largely failed to promote the liberal-democratic 
ideals it campaigned on. It has operated as a “soft-authoritarian” government that has 
suppressed civil liberties, enacted strict censorship, and has been criticized for widespread 
human rights violations against its political opponents.251 
Hamas’s involvement in providing public goods and services traces back to its 
Muslim Brotherhood roots, which was itself very concerned with social welfare.252 
Hamas’s 1988 Charter specifically addressed the importance of waging war against Israel 
with a “fortified society,” which requires religious education and a widespread 
commitment to Islam. Pressure from Israel and competition with the PLO pushed Hamas 
to expand its operations in social services and grassroots-level politics.253 Social services 
have become one of Hamas’s primary sources of influence, are key to its popularity and 
recruiting, and have helped foster legitimacy for the group by demonstrating its capability 
as an administrative institution.254 As early as 1994, Palestinians viewed Hamas as more 
trustworthy than the PLO and even non-Hamas supporters donated to the organization due 
to its reputation for trustworthiness.255 Hamas’s role in Palestinian society is also seen 
through employment, as Hamas is the single largest employer in Gaza.256 
The provision of goods and services was critical to the Palestinian population. As 
Palestine has faced sanctions and pressure from Israel and the international community, the 
ability for the PA to provide services to Palestinians has been affected. The inability of the 
government to provide goods and services meant that charities and Islamist organizations 
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like Hamas had an increasingly important role in providing aid. In 2001, for example, 6 
percent of services were provided by the PA, 34 percent by the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), and 60 percent by charitable 
organizations.257 
The type of social welfare and public goods provided by Hamas has ranged 
considerably, from small groups of volunteers distributing food to large specialized 
medical facilities.258 Hamas funds and sponsors food banks, mosques, schools, 
orphanages, medical clinics and hospitals, and even summer camps and sports 
complexes.259 Hamas specifically places great emphasis on caring for children and 
families, as it provides for orphans until the age of sixteen and gives monthly stipends to 
the families of those killed (martyred) or imprisoned by Israel.260 Hamas provides low-
cost education to Palestinian children through 12th grade and has coordinated with Fatah to 
ensure education programs are funded and meet standardized curriculum goals.261 Hamas 
even runs an entire propaganda division complete with several radio stations, newspapers, 
websites, and multiple television stations.262 Even prior to its 2007 Gaza takeover, Hamas 
had made significant improvements to education, healthcare, and banking in Gaza. 
Since its 2007 takeover of Gaza and crackdown on Fatah organizations, Hamas has 
taken over all over Fatah’s charities in Gaza and maintains dominance over all social 
services either through direct sponsorship or influential control.263 These organizations are 
known for their efficiency and, contrary to outside claims, are generally far from Islamic 
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in practice.264 It has also regularly worked with the PLO and it international counterparts 
to transparently provide services to all Palestinians regardless of political affiliation.265 
Despite its accomplishments, the quality and extent of Hamas’s provision of social 
welfare has not always been consistent due to pressure from Israel, the United States, and 
Fatah.266 Throughout the 1990s, for example, Israel and the PA shut down numerous 
charitable organizations and mosques in Gaza that were believed to be affiliated with 
Hamas.267 This was also the case after Hamas’s 2006 legislative election success, as Israel 
and the U.S. enacted strict sanctions (and the Israeli blockade) on Gaza which crippled 
Hamas’s social welfare capabilities.268 Fatah also withheld funding, trade, and much-need 
provisions from the West Bank after 2006.269 Even though Israeli occupation and the 
Gazan blockade weakened Hamas, Hamas has always provided services to some degree 
due to its ability to raise funds internally and through other foreign sources, thus allowing 
it to continue reaching hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and maintain popular 
support.270 
I. EXPLANATIONS 
The decision to provide public goods and governance rather than solely committing 
violence against a population is likely a complex relationship of multiple factors. This 
section, however, will analyze how the Hamas case study appears to fit within the 
hypotheses laid out in the introductory chapter. It will examine the correlations that do or 
do not support the hypotheses in addition to comparing the Hamas case study with 
Hezbollah and AQAP. 
                                                 
264 Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza, 14–15, 91. 
265 Roy, 89–90. 
266 Hroub, Hamas: A Beginners Guide, 72–73. 
267 Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, 240–241. 
268 Weigand, Bombs and Ballots, 156. 
269 Weigand, Bombs and Ballots, 156. 
270 Baconi, Hamas Contained, 118; Hroub, Hamas: A Beginners Guide, 72–73; Weigand, Bombs and 
Ballots, 156. 
50 
H1: Territorial security and legitimacy are significant factors behind insurgents’ 
decision and ability to provide governance and public goods to their constituents. 
Hamas has clearly held territorial control within Gaza since 2007, which has 
certainly been instrumental in allowing Hamas the opportunity to govern. However, Hamas 
began its extensive social welfare operation over a decade prior to taking over Gaza, has 
been active in local politics since the mid-1990s, and began running in Palestinian-wide 
elections prior to gaining territorial control. That said, it began its move from municipal-
level to national-level elections as its influence in Gaza increased due to Israeli 
retrenchment and withdrawal from Gaza and as Fatah’s popularity declined. 
Hamas is therefore similar to AQAP in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon (both are 
considered to have territorial control) since it has maintained strong influence in Gaza since 
the 1990s and has held complete control since its takeover in 2007. 
H2: Secessionist rebel groups are more likely to provide governance and public 
goods to their constituents than non-secessionist groups. 
Hamas is considered secessionist due to the fact that it is not a recognized state and 
remains under the thumb of Israel. Although Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005 and Hamas 
has been independent of Fatah and the PA since 2007, it is clearly not given the recognition 
or freedom of other states in the international community. Quite simply, the creation of a 
separate, independent Palestinian state is Hamas’s core reason for existing.  
While Hamas’s 1988 Charter states that it wants to eliminate the state of Israel and 
form an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine, the rhetoric of its leaders has suggested 
that it would accept a long-term “interim solution” based on the pre-1967 borders, with 
Palestine operating fully and completely separate from Israel. Hamas’s classification as a 
secessionist group is therefore a distinction between AQAP and Hezbollah, both of which 
are non-secessionist. 
H3: Rebel groups that exist in weak states are likely to provide governance and 
public goods to their constituents.  
51 
The entirety of Palestine has been weak for decades. However, it is controlled and 
surrounded by Israel, which held a military occupation over the Gaza Strip until 2005 and 
still holds a military occupation over 80 percent of the West Bank. In stark contrast to Fatah 
and Hamas, Israel is an extremely strong state with a united government, robust economy, 
and operates the strongest military in the Middle East—and has the firm backing of the 
United States. 
The Hamas case study is notably different from Hezbollah and AQAP regarding 
the strength of state government as Yemen is a failed state,271 Lebanon a recovering failed 
state,272 and Israel a strong state with a far more powerful military. 
H4: Rebel groups with greater overall capability are more likely to provide 
governance and public goods to their constituents than groups with moderate to weak 
capability. 
The capability and funding of Hamas can be described as weak to moderate. While 
Hamas has an annual budget as high as $150 million, maintains firm control within Gaza, 
and has provided social welfare to Gazans even in the midst of international sanctions and 
the Israeli blockade, the fact remains that Gaza is one of the poorest places in the world. 
Sanctions and the Israel blockade have weakened Hamas273 and resulted in severe water 
and electricity shortages and a 40 percent unemployment rate. If Hamas had a high level 
of capability (or greater outside funding) it would likely be able to better address the dire 
needs of its constituents. 
Hamas’s level of funding and capability appear to fall closer to AQAP than to 
Hezbollah. Hezbollah is entrenched into Lebanese politics and has received significant 
levels of funding and support from Iran since its creation—with an estimated budget range 
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of $200 million to over $1 billion annually.274 AQAP, meanwhile, had a much lower level 
of funding. Although it received millions of dollars from hostage ransoms and $100 million 
from the central bank in Mukalla, this level of funding was inconsistent and likely lower 
on an annual average.275 Hamas’s capability and funding may be somewhat higher than 
AQAP’s, but it is also far lower than that of Hezbollah. 
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IV. AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Similar to Hezbollah and Hamas, AQAP is a complex organization. Emerging from 
al Qaeda Central and its Yemeni roots, AQAP has separated itself from its parent 
organization both organizationally and ideologically. In contrast with the global jihadi 
mindset of al Qaeda Central, AQAP has oriented its goals and operations towards the local 
level. 
Since its founding in 2009, AQAP has utilized both violent and non-violent methods 
in order to establish territory and cement its rule. Particular emphasis has been placed on 
governing the constituents within its territory and on providing services and public goods, 
ranging from providing food and basic healthcare to trash collection and the establishment 
of a functional justice system. 
This case study will discuss the development of AQAP and how it fits into the 
complicated and chaotic history of Yemen, in addition to its use of violent and non-violent 
strategies. It will also examine how this case study fits into the hypotheses listed in the first 
chapter and how they compare with Hezbollah and Hamas. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Yemen has spent much of its contemporary history divided into two states. The 
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was founded in 1970 in northern Yemen while the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was founded in 1967 after leftist revolutionaries in 
southern Yemen successfully forced the British from the Federation of South Arabia 
protectorate.276 While the YAR was as a republican state backed by Egypt and Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, the PDRY to the south was a socialist state backed by the Soviet Union. Despite 
fighting between the two states and a civil war in the southern PDRY in 1986, the YAR and 
PDRY unified in 1990. 
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The hurried marriage between the two states came as both neared economic collapse 
and quickly saw YAR leader Ali Abdullah Saleh and his northern counterparts seize a greater 
share of political power in what was meant to be an equal partnership between north and 
south.277 After a brief but brutal civil war in 1994, Yemen’s northern elite solidified their 
dominant position in the government for years to come.278 Through President Saleh’s 
General People’s Congress (GPC) and Islah, Yemen’s primary Sunni Islamist party, northern 
elites dominated the south for control of the country, going largely unchallenged until 
2011.2797 
It is in post-unification Yemen that al Qaeda’s presence in the country begins. Al 
Qaeda’s foundation and role in Yemen is tied both to domestic politics and trends in global 
jihadism. As fighters returned from anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the early in 1990s, 
many Arab states turned against the jihadists.280 Yemen, however, welcomed the fighters 
and encouraged them to settle in southern Yemen. These fighters were supported by Saleh 
and were employed against the southern Yemeni Socialist Party during Yemen’s 1994 civil 
war.281 Over the years, Saleh would maintain a fickle relationship with the extremist fighters 
but often supported them by releasing them from jail, misusing U.S. anti-terrorism funds, 
and maintaining jihadi fighters on his payroll in order to fight his domestic adversaries.282 
In 1989, Osama bin Laden, motivated by a desire to spark a global movement of 
Muslims and to establish a caliphate, created al Qaeda.283 Bin Laden hoped to use Yemen 
as al Qaeda’s first test but saw little progress and later fled to Sudan. Al Qaeda gradually 
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strengthened and gained notoriety through several high-profile events including a takeover 
of Aden in 1994, the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the 2000 
bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, and ultimately its infamous attack on the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001. Under extreme pressure, Saleh’s government began cooperating with 
the U.S. in its fight against Yemeni-based al Qaeda fighters, largely defeating the group by 
2003.284 
By treating al Qaeda as completely defeated in Yemen, the group was generally 
ignored by the U.S. and Yemeni government and was gradually able to make its return. Aided 
by the 2006 prison escape of 23 suspected al Qaeda fighters, including Qasim al-Raymi and 
Nasir al-Wahayshi (Osama bin Laden’s former secretary), al Qaeda slowly reorganized and 
rebuilt itself in Yemen285 and in January 2009, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
was officially formed with the merger of al Qaeda’s Yemeni and Saudi branches.286 By 
2011, AQAP had become al Qaeda’s most lethal branch and boasted several thousand 
fighters.287 Since its 2009 creation, AQAP has been behind countless attacks and attempted 
attacks in Yemen and across the world. AQAP’s most notable operations include the 
“Underwear Bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attempt to bomb a Northwest Airlines 
flight in 2009, an attempt to send explosive-laden packages aboard U.S. aircraft in 2010, and 
the 2015 attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine’s office in Paris.288 
As the Arab Spring swept across the Middle East in 2011, protests demanding change 
and for the replacement of President Saleh broke out across Yemen. Despite offering 
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concessions (following an initially brutal response to protests),289 domestic and international 
pressures forced Saleh to transfer power to Vice President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi in 
2012.290 By 2014, however, Houthi militants in northern Yemen joined forces with Saleh 
and his supporters against the Hadi government. In September, Houthi militants took over 
the central government in Sanaa and forced President Hadi to flee to Aden and later to Saudi 
Arabia.291 The country spiraled into civil war as the Houthi-Saleh alliance (with Iranian 
support) fought Hadi and his loyalist forces (with the support of Saudi Arabia and an 
international coalition).292 Already one of the region’s poorest countries prior to 2011, 
Yemen has collapsed into the world’s most pressing humanitarian crisis.293 
As feared by many in the international community, the state of chaos in 2011 and 
beyond (and the void left by the central government) allowed other groups in the country to 
gain strength.294 The secessionist Southern movement, Hirak, stepped up its efforts for a 
referendum on independence, AQAP was able to seize large swaths of land across southern 
Yemen, and even the Islamic State (IS) established a foothold in the country after 2015.295 
Although UAE and U.S.-led attacks in 2016 and 2017 significantly reduced AQAP’s 
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territory, the group remains a powerful force in southern Yemen.296 As this chapter will 
examine further, AQAP enacted their own form of governance in their territories and 
provided public goods to their constituents at a level far exceeding that of the state 
government.297 
In December 2017, Saleh was killed by Houthi rebels after the two brief allies turned 
on each other.298 As of 2018, the civil war rages on, Saudi and coalition strikes continue, 
and the devasting humanitarian crisis has only worsened with time.299 
C. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s primary goals are to seize and hold territory, 
gradually implement sharia, and to eventually form an Islamic caliphate. It views its primary 
adversaries as the Yemeni and Saudi Arabian governments, along with the United States.300  
Despite the ambitious nature of these goals, AQAP has proved adept at balancing its 
ideological goals with the realities of local insurgency.301 AQAP therefore differs somewhat 
from al Qaeda Central regarding the scope of its target. While al Qaeda Central has long been 
focused on attacking the far enemy, the United States (which supports non-Islamic 
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governments in the Middle East), AQAP has focused primarily on Yemen and Saudi Arabia 
with only a handful of attacks against the West.302 Despite AQAP’s vocal encouragement of 
“lone-wolf” attacks in the West, it is a much lower priority for the group.303 In this sense, 
AQAP’s religious and ideological goals have been made secondary to its immediate and 
pragmatic goal of building local support.304 Once a strong local backing has been established, 
AQAP would likely seek to increase its foreign operations.305 Ultimately, AQAP seeks to 
link its own Islamic emirate with others in Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan, and Iraq.306 
D. STRENGTH OF STATE GOVERNMENT 
Even before the 2011 Arab Uprisings spread to Yemen, the country had long been a 
hotbed for violence and political turmoil.307 Once the Arab Spring protests began, however, 
political infighting between President Saleh and the Islah party escalated and split the 
government’s security apparatus. As the country fell into civil war and the Houthis took over 
Sanaa, the ability of the Yemeni government and military to demonstrate control 
vanished.308 Yemen’s security forces were divided, degraded, lacked a central command, 
and had little incentive to continue fighting.309 This created a power vacuum that AQAP, 
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Zaydi Houthis in the north, and the secessionist Southern Movement all took advantage 
of.310 These factors all contributed to AQAP’s ability to seize territory in 2011 and 2015 
with minimal bloodshed and little resistance from the Yemeni security services.311 
Yemen’s status as a collapsed state not only resulted in an ineffective security 
apparatus and the rise of non-state actors like AQAP but it also magnified pre-existing 
humanitarian issues. The Yemeni government has been completely incapable of providing 
basic services, like water and electricity, to its population while disease and malnutrition 
have strangled the country.312 As of February 2018, the United Nations had declared that 22 
million of Yemen’s 25 million citizens were in need of humanitarian assistance, with over 
half of those in acute need. Yemen’s ability to provide goods, services, and security for its 
population is almost entirely non-existent and it is in this state of chaos that we find the rise 
of non-state actors such as AQAP. 
E. TERRITORIAL CONTROL 
 Although AQAP maintained a strong presence in multiple governates across Yemen 
and has had brief control of small towns and villages,313 its noteworthy periods of full 
territorial control can be viewed in two distinct phases: from May 2011 to May 2012 in the 
Abyan and Shabwa governates and from April 2015 to April 2016 in the Hadramawt 
governate, particularly the port city of al-Mukalla (depicted in Figure 3). 
 In May 2011, AQAP seized control of Abyan’s capital, Zinjibar, and its surrounding 
areas with little resistance from government forces.314 As it gradually took control of large 
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parts of Abyan and its neighboring governate, Shabwa, AQAP achieved its first opportunity 
to govern territory.315 Throughout its year of control, AQAP maintained full control of its 
territory, provided basic services to the population, and instituted a sharia-based justice 
system. In May 2012, the Yemeni Armed Forces, with support from tribal militias and the 
United States military, launched an offensive campaign which successfully stripped AQAP 
of its territorial gains.316 
 
Figure 3.  Map of the Republic of Yemen.317 
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In April 2015, AQAP successfully seized al-Mukalla, with a population of over 
300,000, and large swaths of territory across southern Hadramawt.318 After months of 
preparation and coalition building with tribal leaders, AQAP rapidly seized the port city 
with almost no bloodshed.319 AQAP held full control over this territory for one year while 
it worked with local leaders, implemented a social services program, and worked to 
gradually transform the society into an Islamic emirate under sharia. In April 2016, Saudi 
and Emirati-backed forces retook al-Mukalla. While coalition officials labeled it a defeat 
of AQAP, AQAP itself referred to it as a strategic retreat in order to save civilian lives.320 
As it was, AQAP gradualists had anticipated and planned their retreat in order to prevent 
massive losses to the organization and the destruction of goodwill it had worked so hard to 
build with the local population. 
After being forced from al-Mukalla, AQAP relocated to neighboring governates 
and blended with the local population while continuing to expand its influence in the 
governates of Taiz, Ibb, and al-Bayda.321 Despite not holding control of territory, AQAP 
has continued to exercise on and off control of territory within the Abyan and Shabwa 
governates.322 
F. FUNDING 
Since its foundation, AQAP has relied on a variety of sources for funding including 
hostage ransoms, phony charities, bank robberies, and taxes on trade in the port city of al-
Mukalla.323 While AQAP relied heavily on hostage ransoms prior to 2015, the group 
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amassed a sizable war chest from bank robberies and taxes as it controlled territory across 
the Hadramawt governate from April 2015 to April 2016. 
In an August 2012 letter to al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), AQAP leader Nasser 
al-Wuhayshi wrote that “kidnapping hostages is an easy spoil” and stated that almost half 
of AQAP’s funding at that time came from hostage ransoms.324 As European and Middle 
Eastern governments (particularly France, Oman, and Qatar) paid out over a $100 million 
in ransoms to various terrorist groups across the Middle East, AQAP received almost $30 
million from 2011 to 2013 alone.325 This allowed AQAP to recover from US-led 
counterinsurgency operations, seize new territory, and position itself to take advantage of 
the turmoil across Yemen.326 
After taking over the port city of al-Mukalla and much of the Hadramawt governate 
in April 2015, AQAP drastically improved its financial position. In addition to seizing 
weapons from an Yemeni Army depot, AQAP stole an estimated $60 million from al-
Mukalla’s central bank.327 During its yearlong control of the port city, AQAP extorted 
private companies and earned $2 million to $5 million each day from taxes and customs 
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duties applied to fuel and goods coming into and out of the port.328 These funds allowed 
AQAP to provide public goods and services to those within its territory as well as to pay 
its fighters, estimated at nearly 4,000 at its peak.329 With an annual operation budget 
estimated at $10 million, AQAP’s peak war chest of an estimated $100 million provided it 
considerable financial resources for long-term operations.330 
G. USE OF VIOLENCE 
AQAP’s use of violence from 2010 to 2017 represented a stark change compared 
to previous al Qaeda affiliates. Learning from al Qaeda’s experience in Iraq, AQAP relied 
less on violence and instead focused on gradualism for ruling territory, particularly during 
its second opportunity to govern.331  
In Abyan from 2011 to 2012, AQAP compromised, to a degree, on its harsh 
implementation of sharia in pursuance of a “hearts and minds” strategy.332 Markets for 
qat, for example, were moved outside the main cities rather than being banned outright and 
AQAP worked to persuade locals to give up other vices such as cigarette smoking.333 
Despite a degree of compromise and gradualism, AQAP’s eventually reverted to using 
violence as they consolidated power.334 The group crucified an accused spy and publicly 
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executed several others. It flogged locals for drinking alcohol, banned Arab music, and 
assaulted those who did not attend mosque during required times.335 While some local 
Yemenis praised this harsh rule for establishing long-absent security, many others were 
opposed to it and accused AQAP fighters for using violence indiscriminately and without 
cause. Despite bringing security to Abyan (one method in which AQAP hoped to win hearts 
and minds), many Yemenis were happy to see them go in May 2012 and even assisted in 
forcing them out.336 
AQAP learned from these lessons in its 2015 to 2016 takeover of al-Mukalla and 
the Hadramawt governate and was even more committed to prioritizing gradualism over 
violence within its territory.337 While banned activities, floggings, and executions 
occurred, the use of violence was used sparingly and intended to serve as an example to 
other locals.338 In fact, when AQAP was forced out of al-Mukalla it coordinated its 
departure with coalition forces to ensure minimal losses to itself and to civilians.339 In this 
case, AQAP believed that potential civilian casualties would significantly erode the 
goodwill it had spent the better part of two years developing. 
What violence AQAP has resorted to, meanwhile, has been primarily focused on 
those not under its territorial control. AQAP has attacked Yemeni government and military 
officials and fought heavily against Houthi fighters (particularly after 2014).340 In doing 
so, AQAP has relied on a number of asymmetric and guerrilla techniques including 
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ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and assassinations.341 It sustained 
fighting across multiple governates and even established the coordinating capability to 
conduct simultaneous attacks across five governates.342 In addition to government and 
military officials, AQAP has also carried out assassinations against local leaders in order 
to undercut resistance.343 
H. USE OF GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC GOODS 
In a shift from al Qaeda’s experience in Iraq, AQAP has emphasized a grassroots 
approach in which the group embeds itself into the tribal social fabric.344 To accomplish 
this, AQAP created the subsidiary organization, Ansar al-Sharia (Supporters of Islamic 
Law), in 2011.345 Ansar al-Sharia (AAS) serves as AQAP’s domestic arm and allows 
AQAP to operate on the ground without some of the controversy of the al Qaeda brand.346 
In October 2012, the United States Department of State designated Ansar al-Sharia as an 
alias of AQAP (rather than as a separate organization) and stated that “AAS is simply 
AQAP’s effort to rebrand itself, with the aim of manipulating people to join AQAP’s 
terrorist cause.”347 Similarly, according to senior AQAP official Abu Zubayr Adel al-
Abab: “the name Ansar al-Sharia is what we use to introduce ourselves in areas where we 
work.”348 While Ansar al-Sharia is an extension of AQAP, AAS works more closely with 
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local communities and tribes, its members are composed primarily of local Yemenis, and 
its interests are more domestically focused. Despite layers and variance among AAS 
members’ level of support and loyalty to AQAP, it is undeniable that the two organizations 
highly intertwined in membership, support, and overall agendas.349 
In August 2012, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the leader of AQAP until his death in June 
2015, summarized AQAP’s approach to governance in his letter to the leader AQIM by 
emphasizing a “hearts and minds” approach in which goodwill was earned by providing 
governance and public goods.350 He stated that “providing these necessities will have a 
great effect on people, and will make them sympathize with us and feel that their fate is 
tied to ours” and encouraged AQIM to take a gradual approach in enforcing religious 
law.351  
The long-standing inability of the Yemeni government to provide services or 
security to its population was essential for AQAP’s ability to step in and replicate the duties 
of a functional government.352 The goods and services provided by AQAP in its two 
periods of governance were robust, extensive, and superior to anything the Yemeni 
government had previously provided.353 During its rule in Abyan, AQAP distributed food, 
gas, fresh water, and electricity to those under its control. AQAP even provided teachers, 
collected trash, installed sewage pipes, and provided basic healthcare.354 In interviews 
with the local population, many stressed that these services were provided promptly, for 
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free, and in the case of electricity, for the first time in decades.355 During AQAP’s rule of 
the Hadramawt it provided many of the same goods and services to the local population as 
it had in 2011–2012, including infrastructure projects, paying the salaries for local civil 
servants, providing food and medical supplies, and even hosting community events.356 
During these periods of territorial control, AQAP magnified their actions through a robust 
propaganda campaign, which included using Twitter and its own media wing.357 
Key to AQAP’s method for governance was its ability to provide security and 
justice to the local population. In 2011–2012, AQAP ran the local police force and enacted 
an efficient sharia-based court system. Although its justice system became increasingly 
strict during its year of rule, it was an unsurprising form of justice in an area that had long 
been without and created a significant reduction in crime.358 In 2015–2016 (and in the year 
prior to its takeover), AQAP softened its approach to governance and placed a greater 
emphasis on gradualism and working with tribal and local leaders than it had in 2011–
2012.359 While AQAP worked with local leaders during its 2011–2012 rule of Abyan and 
Shabwa, it placed greater emphasis on ruling through proxies during its 2015–2016 rule of 
al-Mukalla and Hadramawt, and even worked to exploit inter-tribal rivalries when 
possible.360 AQAP also formed the Hadramawt National Council with local tribes, a local 
ruling council that oversaw day-to-day governance and a militia force that protected 
schools, banks, and local government buildings.361 
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Interviews with local Yemenis indicate mixed perceptions of AQAP and Ansar al-
Sharia. While many locals praised the groups for their public goods provision, justice 
system, and the level of security they brought to the area, many others reported that they 
were glad to see the group and its brutal tactics leave (and even helped fight against 
them).362 Both views appear based on indisputable facts: AQAP and AAS provided far 
higher levels of governance and public goods than the central government at the same time 
that it enforced a sharia-based system of justice (at varying degrees of harshness and 
severity). Of note, after AQAP was forced out of their strongholds in 2012 and 2016, living 
conditions for Yemenis in Abyan and the Hadramawt worsened as the civil war raged on 
and the central government remained completely incapable of providing security or 
services.363  
I. EXPLANATIONS 
The decision to provide public goods and governance rather than solely committing 
violence against a population is likely a complex relationship of multiple factors. This 
section, however, will analyze how the AQAP case study appears to fit within the 
hypotheses laid out in the introductory chapter. It will examine the correlations that do or 
do not support the hypotheses in addition to comparing the AQAP case study with 
Hezbollah and Hamas. 
H1: Territorial security and legitimacy are significant factors behind insurgents’ 
decision and ability to provide governance and public goods to their constituents. 
This hypothesis appears to hold true for AQAP in a manner different from 
Hezbollah and Hamas. Since AQAP’s creation, it has twice held territory for roughly a 
year in each instance. It was during these periods, and only during these periods, that AQAP 
was able to provide public goods and services to Yemeni civilians. Although it is true that 
AQAP worked with local and tribal leaders prior to its 2015–2016 takeover of al-Mukalla 
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and the Hadramawt governate (when the Yemeni government held control), the building 
of relationships is far from the widespread distribution of goods and services that followed 
once they gained territorial control. 
This hypothesis therefore holds true for all three case studies but receives the most 
interesting and robust support in the AQAP case study, as the group clearly was able to 
provide goods and services while they held territorial control and unable to when the 
Yemeni government held control. 
H2: Secessionist rebel groups are more likely to provide governance and public 
goods to their constituents than non-secessionist groups. 
Whereas Hamas can be classified as secessionist, Hezbollah and AQAP are both 
non-secessionist. AQAP’s efforts in Yemen seek to control their own territory but are not 
actively involved in any attempts to seek independence from Yemen and create their own 
formal state. While the analysis of just three case studies in this thesis is not enough to 
prove this hypothesis as false, it is clear that two of the three case studies examined do not 
support it. 
H3: Rebel groups that exist in weak states are likely to provide governance and 
public goods to their constituents.  
This hypothesis is clearly supported by the AQAP and Yemeni case study. Yemen 
has collapsed into a failed state with multiple factions sparring in a complicated civil war. 
The Yemeni government has proven incapable of providing goods and services to its 
citizens and has demonstrated itself as unable to adequately maintain state security against 
AQAP without outside support. 
AQAP in Yemen joins Hezbollah in Lebanon in providing support to this 
hypothesis, as AQAP operates in a failed state and Hezbollah operates in a previously 
failed, but now recovering, state. Hamas meanwhile operates in an area controlled and 
dominated by Israel, a strong state with a robust military capability. 
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H4: Rebel groups with greater overall capability are more likely to provide 
governance and public goods to their constituents than groups with moderate to weak 
capability. 
AQAP appears to support this hypothesis in a manner different than Hezbollah and 
Hamas. AQAP provided goods and services over two separate one-year periods. In the first 
instance, AQAP had a smaller war chest than in 2015–2016 and was less committed to 
providing good governance and public goods. After initial efforts, AQAP gradually 
resorted to increased levels of violence against its constituents. After its 2015 takeover of 
al-Mukalla and the Hadramawt governate, however, there appears to be a correlation 
between its improved financial position and greater commitment to governance and public 
goods. By raiding the central bank in al-Mukalla and extracting taxes from shipments in 
and out of the port, AQAP clearly had more financial capability than it did over 2011–2012 
and simultaneously demonstrated greater provision of goods and services. 
This case study matches up with Hezbollah and Hamas, both of which had sizeable 




Research into rebel violence has been the main focus of scholars over the years. 
Less prominent has been research into rebel governance. This thesis has sought to study 
this underexplored topic and contribute to a relatively new field of inquiry. It seeks to 
explain how rebel governance and public goods unfolded in three important Islamist 
movements: Hezbollah, Hamas, and AQAP. This thesis also seeks to contribute to how 
states can counter the influence of such militant groups and their attempts to build 
legitimacy and consolidate power through the provision of public goods. Increased 
discussion on the topic could establish universally accepted definitions and (potentially) an 
agreed upon causal chain of what factors lead rebel groups to emphasize either violence or 
governance. 
A. HYPOTHESES 
While 70 percent of rebel groups do not provide governance to their 
constituents,364 this thesis has aimed to find causal factors for the 30 percent that do. From 
examining existing literature on rebel governance and the three case studies in this thesis, 
I argue that the most significant reasons in explaining rebel governance concern territorial 
security and legitimacy (Hypothesis 1) and the overall capability and funding of the rebel 
group (Hypothesis 4). While secessionist motivations (Hypothesis 2) and the presence of a 
weak state (Hypothesis 3) may play a role, their impact was noticeably less clear from 
qualitative analysis. 
While the four hypotheses have been discussed in each case study chapter, this 
section will provide an analysis of my findings from the three case studies and an overall, 
qualitative assessment of the strength of each hypothesis: 
H1: Territorial security and legitimacy are significant factors behind insurgents’ 
decision and ability to provide governance and public goods to their constituents. 
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The case of Hezbollah firmly supports this hypothesis as Hezbollah has maintained 
significant influence in the Shia regions of the country since the early 1980s. This influence 
has developed into solid territorial control of southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern 
suburbs at the expense of the central Lebanese government. The government has employed 
a “gentleman’s agreement” where it does not contest Hezbollah’s dominance in these areas. 
This has given Hezbollah the freedom to act without constraint and to provide governance 
and public goods to its constituents. 
Hamas is similar to Hezbollah in that it has long held influence and control over 
territory. Hamas maintained strong influence in the Gaza Strip throughout the mid-1990s 
and early 2000s and has held a total monopoly on the use of force since 2007. Although 
Hamas certainly faces various pressure from outside forces such as the Palestinian 
Authority and Israel, its dominance in the Gaza Strip is unquestioned and uncontested. 
The case study of AQAP is what provides the strongest overall support for this 
hypothesis as it was clearly able to provide governance and public goods while it 
maintained territorial control and unable to do so when it did not control territory. AQAP’s 
ability to govern its constituents in the Abyan and Shabwa governates (May 2011 to May 
2012) and in the Hadramawt governate (April 2015 to April 2016) provide clear support 
for this hypothesis. While AQAP has maintained a presence in multiple parts of the country 
and has worked to build partnerships with local leaders, it has been unable or unwilling to 
provide governance or public goods outside of the times and places that it held strict control 
of territory. In addition to the overall across-case comparison of this thesis, the AQAP case 
study provides strong within-case support for Hypothesis 1. 
The findings for this hypothesis fit with the arguments of Mampilly, Kalyvas and 
Kasfir. Mampilly and Kalyvas similarly argued that rebel groups may try to use “hearts 
and minds” strategies in contested areas but that advanced levels of governance and welfare 
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provision would need to emerge after “a sufficient period of territorial control.”365 Kasfir, 
meanwhile, asserted that territorial security was a precondition for rebel governance.366 
H2: Secessionist rebel groups are more likely to provide governance and public 
goods to their constituents than non-secessionist groups. 
This thesis does not find robust support for this hypothesis based on qualitative 
analyses of the three case studies. The basis for this hypothesis was rooted in the arguments 
of Mampilly and Stewart: Mampilly contended that governance was more likely to be 
found in secessionist groups than in non-secessionist groups,367 while Stewart argued that 
secessionist groups are more likely to use inclusive incentives and public goods while non-
secessionist groups typically rely on exclusive incentives.368 
While Hamas is classified as secessionist as it is adamant in its desire for Palestinian 
statehood and sovereignty free of Israeli control, Hezbollah is satisfied with its territorial 
control and participation in electoral politics and AQAP seeks neither formal statehood or 
independence from the Yemeni central government. Since these three case studies provide 
a mix of secessionist and non-secessionist groups, variation should be expected based on 
Mampilly and Stewart’s arguments. Yet all three case studies demonstrated successful 
efforts to provide governance and inclusive public goods despite these differences. 
These case studies alone are not enough to disconfirm this hypothesis outright (as 
will be addressed in the limitations section) but it clearly does not provide support for it 
either. 
H3: Rebel groups that exist in weak states are likely to provide governance and 
public goods to their constituents.  
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Hezbollah and AQAP both exist in weak-to-failed states. Lebanon is a long way 
from the failed state that it was in the 1990s but remains a weak state by international 
relations standards. Yemen, meanwhile, has long been a weak state and has further 
devolved into civil war and a failed state status. Lebanon and Yemen’s status as weak states 
has prevented the central government from firmly eradicating domestic threats to their 
sovereignty and legitimacy. This has allowed Hezbollah and AQAP the ability to operate 
and provide governance to their impoverished constituents. Yemen, for its part, has only 
been able to counter the threat of AQAP with the assistance of foreign allies. 
Hamas, meanwhile, exists under the shadow of a strong state. Israel (with the 
support and combined efforts of the Palestinian Authority and the United States) held a 
military presence in the Gaza Strip until 2005 and has long been active in undermining 
Hamas. These efforts include leading international sanction efforts, military campaigns, 
and blockades that prevent critical goods and supplies from entering Gaza. While Hamas 
may maintain territorial control over Gaza, Israel has created a constrained environment 
that severely limits Hamas’s freedom to operate and govern. Although Israel’s efforts have 
at various times impacted the way in which Hamas has provided governance and services, 
Hamas’s dedication to provided public goods has never stopped.369 
While these case studies are unable to disconfirm this hypothesis outright (as in 
Hypothesis 2), these case studies also do not provide support for it. Rather than 
demonstrating variation among the governance and welfare provision between groups in 
weak states versus strong states, all three groups have provided public goods and 
governance regardless of these distinctions. Additionally, using qualitative analysis, there 
appear to be no major differences in the levels of governance and public goods provided 
by Hamas (compared to Hezbollah and AQAP) that would suggest the presence of weak 
states or strong states has had any significant impact.370 
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H4: Rebel groups with greater overall capability are more likely to provide 
governance and public goods to their constituents than groups with moderate to weak 
capability. 
Based on qualitative analysis, levels of funding and overall capability appear to 
have a significant impact on rebel groups’ ability to provide governance and public goods. 
Hezbollah’s efforts toward public goods and welfare provision are the most robust of the 
three case studies. They have an elaborate organizational network and have provided 
extensive support to their constituents from education and medical services to 
communications and public works. Hezbollah rebuilt 5,000 homes in 1996 following 
Israeli attacks and spent an estimated $281 million in compensation and rehabilitation after 
Israel’s 2006 attacks in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah’s welfare services are not only better 
than the central government but are widely praised by the NGO community as efficient 
and superior to other organizations. 
Hamas’s efforts at governance and public goods have been strong but are 
overshadowed by those of Hezbollah. Hamas has supported large medical facilities, 
orphanages, and low-cost education to Gazans, but this has come with restrictions and 
limitations due to external pressures from Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the United 
States. 
AQAP’s ability to provide governance and public goods was clearly the lowest of 
the three case studies. Although AQAP was able to extend electricity and trash collection 
efforts, in addition to providing food, water, basic healthcare, and teachers to its 
constituents (at levels exceeding the capabilities of the central Yemeni government), these 
efforts pale in comparison to the far more robust education and medical services of 
Hezbollah and Hamas. 
The level of welfare provision correlates strongly with the funding and budgets of 
each group. Hezbollah, strongly backed by Iran, is able to provide the most robust welfare 
system of the three groups in part because its annual budget is estimated to range from 
$200 million to over $1 billion. Hamas’s annual budget meanwhile is as high as $150 
million, which still allows it to provide extensive services to its constituents. AQAP’s 
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capacity sits far lower than Hamas and Hezbollah, with an estimated annual budget of $10 
million and a peak war chest in 2015 estimated at only $100 million. 
An important within-case study observation regarding AQAP is the timing of its 
welfare system: when AQAP controlled territory in 2011–2012, the extent of its 
governance and public goods provision was far lower than in 2015–2016.371 AQAP 
initially provided good governance and welfare to its constituents, but these efforts tapered 
off and were gradually replaced by increased levels of coercive violence in 2012. In 2015–
2016, however, AQAP’s commitment to gradualism and welfare provision was far more 
robust and was sustained until the end of its rule. Notably, it is at this time that AQAP had 
seized the port city of al-Mukalla, thus allowing it to raise taxes from the port, raid the 
central bank of an estimated $60 million, and amass its peak war chest of $100 million.372 
This within-case study analysis therefore provides additional support for this hypothesis. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
One strength of this thesis is that the qualitative approach to three case studies 
allows for an in-depth understanding of each group and its dynamics. For example, when 
comparing the ability of groups (across-case study and within-case study) it becomes clear 
that it is not so simple to grade welfare provision as a simple yes or no. There are variations 
among groups and within groups over time. 
This approach is also a limitation for this thesis, however. The sample size for 
comparison is small and limits the ability to make wider claims. Further studies using a 
large-n sample group and quantitative data analysis would provide an important insight 
into these questions. While the variables and dynamics of groups would be lost, a wider 
sample size may provide greater clarity. It would also be helpful to examine additional 
groups that did not provide governance and public goods to their constituents (rather than 
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only groups that did), groups from outside the Middle East, and control for additional 
variables. 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Understanding how and why rebel groups provide governance and public goods to 
their constituents has significant implications for policymakers. Rebel groups are 
fundamentally complex and dynamic, as are their support bases and how they gain 
legitimacy from their constituents. If U.S. policymakers target rebel groups outright, 
without careful considerations of how they provide for their constituents, they could cause 
a number of unknown consequences. Targeting a group that provides welfare services may 
create or worsen a humanitarian crisis. It may also hurt public opinion of the U.S. (both 
locally and around the world) if people fault the U.S. directly. This has the potential of 
strengthening the support base for rebel groups and undermining U.S. or allied efforts. 
These concerns are similar to those of Grynkewich, who argued that rather than 
destroying social welfare services, states should instead seek to “displace” the role of those 
rebel groups by providing strong welfare programs.373 By understanding how rebel groups 
provide governance and public goods, the U.S. and its allies can seek to undermine the 
support and legitimacy of these groups in a targeted and effective way that also limits 
collateral damage and human suffering.  
Greater understanding on the nuances of rebel governance and the factors that 
contribute to it would also provide U.S. analysts and policymakers improved predictive 
assessments. By understanding how specific variables and pre-conditions contribute to 
rebel governance and public goods provision, U.S. policymakers may have a better 
understanding of how groups will operate long-term. Understanding these variables may 
also provide U.S. policymakers the ability to “displace” rebel welfare services earlier on. 
The findings of this thesis specifically are relevant for policymakers as it suggests 
that considerations for secessionist and non-secessionist groups as well as states fighting 
weak or strong states are not necessary in their decision-making process. This thesis finds 
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that policymakers who seek to understand rebel groups and how they will operate should 
not focus on examining secessionist goals or state strength but should instead focus on the 
funding, influence, and territorial control a group has. 
This thesis also suggests that the correlation between governance and public goods 
to levels of funding, influence, and territorial control should be further studied. If these 
findings are accurate, the academic community would benefit from a quantitative analysis 
examining how different levels of funding and territorial control correlate to varying levels 
of governance and provision. 
79 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith. “Al-Qaida’s Wretched Utopia and the Battle for Hearts and Minds.” 
Guardian, April 30, 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/30/
alqaida-yemen-jihadis-sharia-law. 
Akcinaroglu, Seden, and Efe Tokdemir. “To Instill Fear or Love: Terrorist Groups and 
the Strategy of Building Reputation.” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 
2016, 073889421663429. 
Al Batati, Saeed. “Yemen: The Truth Behind Al-Qaeda’s Takeover of Mukalla.” Al 
Jazeera. September 16, 2015. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/yemen-
truth-al-qaeda-takeover-mukalla-150914101527567.html. 
Al Jazeera. “More than 1,000 Palestinians in Gaza Died from Israeli Blockade.” February 
25, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/1000-palestinians-gaza-died-
israeli-blockade-180225175751636.html. 
Al-Shishani, Murad Batal. “Bringing Shari’a Rule to Yemen and Saudi Arabia: Al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula’s Post-Revolution Strategies.” Terrorism Monitor 9, no. 
37 (October 14, 2011). https://jamestown.org/program/bringing-sharia-rule-to-
yemen-and-saudi-arabia-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsulas-post-revolution-
strategies/. 
Alley, April Longley. “Assessing (In)security After the Arab Spring: The Case of 
Yemen.” PS: Political Science & Politics 46, no. 04 (2013): 721–26. 
Arjona, Ana, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly. “Introduction.” In Rebel 
Governance in Civil War, edited by Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah 
Mampilly, 1–20. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Associated Press. “Al-Qaeda Seizes Large Weapons Cache in Eastern Yemen.” 
Washington Post. April 17, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
middle_east/al-qaeda-seizes-large-weapons-cache-in-eastern-yemen/2015/04/17/
9f1d9eb0-e53c-11e4-905f-cc896d379a32_story.html. 
Azani, Eitan. “The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study.” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 11 (2013): 899–916. 
Baconi, Tareq. Hamas Contained: The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018. 
Barfi, Barak. “AQAP’s Soft Power Strategy in Yemen.” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 11 
(November 2010): 1–5. https://ctc.usma.edu/aqaps-soft-power-strategy-in-
yemen/. 
80 
Baylouny, Anne Marie. “Born Violent: Armed Political Parties and Non-State 
Governance in Lebanon’s Civil War.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, no. 2 
(2014): 329–53. 
Bayoumy, Yara, Noah Browning, and Mohammed Ghobari. “How Saudi Arabia’s War in 
Yemen Has Made Al Qaeda Stronger and Richer.” Reuters. April 08, 2016. 
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/. 
BBC. “Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s Former Leader, Killed in Sanaa.” December 4, 
2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42225574. 
BBC. “Lebanon: UN Names Hezbollah Men in Rafik Hariri Case.” July 29, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14345997. 
Berti, Benedetta, and Beatriz Gutiérrez. “Rebel-to-Political and Back? Hamas as a 
Security Provider in Gaza Between Rebellion, Politics and Governance.” 
Democratization 23, no. 6 (2016): 1059–1076. 
Brenner, Björn. Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. 
London: I.B. Tauris, 2017. 
Callimachi, Rukmini. “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror.” New York 
Times, July 29, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/
ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html. 
Cammett, Melani. “Habitat for Hezbollah.” Foreign Policy, August 17, 2006. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2006/08/17/habitat-for-hezbollah/. 
Cammett, Melani. “How Hezbollah Helps (and What it Gets Out of It).” Washington 
Post, October 2, 2014. Accessed February 20, 2018. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/02/how-
hezbollah-helps-and-what-it-gets-out-of-it/. 
Cammett, Melani. “Sectarianism and the Ambiguities of Welfare in Lebanon.” Current 
Anthropology 56, no. S11 (2015). 
Carlino, Ludovico. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Makes Inroads in Southern 
Yemen but Reveals Limits to Its Operational Capabilities.” Terrorism Monitor 11, 
no. 13 (June 27, 2013). https://jamestown.org/program/al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-
peninsula-makes-inroads-in-southern-yemen-but-reveals-limits-to-its-operational-
capabilities/. 
Clark, Victoria. Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2010. 
Clements, Ashley. “Yemen: Lives at Risk.” The World Today 66, no. 11 (November 
2010): 24–25. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41962464. 
81 
University of Texas at Austin., “Distribution of Religious Groups.” Accessed February 
15, 2018. http://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/
lebanon_religions_83.jpg.  
Economist. “Al-Qaeda Is Losing Ground in Yemen. Yet Is Far from Defeated.” January 
10, 2017. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/06/10/al-
qaeda-is-losing-ground-in-yemen.-yet-is-far-from-defeated. 
Economist. “Hamas Marks Ten Years of Misruling Gaza.” July 13, 2017. 
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/07/13/hamas-marks-ten-
years-of-misruling-gaza. 
Economist. “What Is Going on in Yemen?” March 29, 2015. 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-
explains-24. 
Edroos, Faisal, and Saleh Al Batati. “After Al-Qaeda: No Signs of Recovery in Yemen’s 
Mukalla.” Al Jazeera. January 11, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
features/al-qaeda-signs-recovery-yemen-mukalla-180111135554851.html. 
Fanusie, Yaya J., and Alex Entz. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Financial 
Assessment. Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Center for Sanctions and 
Illicit Finance. July 2017. http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/
documents/CSIF_TFBB_AQAP_web.pdf. 
Flanigan, Shawn Teresa. “Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: the 
Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 
6 (2008): 499–519. 
Flanigan, Shawn Teresa, and Cheryl O’brien. “Service-Seeking Behavior, Perceptions of 
Armed Actors, and Preferences Regarding Governance: Evidence from the 
Palestinian Territories.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 8 (May 2015): 
622–51. 
Flanigan, Shawn Teresa, and Mounah Abdel-Samad. “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad: 
Nonprofits as Resistance Organizations.” Middle East Policy 16, no. 2 (2009): 
122–37. 
Gleis, Joshua L., and Benedetta Berti. Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. 
Green, Daniel. “Al-Qaeda’s Resiliency in Yemen.” The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy. August 7, 2013. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
view/al-qaedas-resiliency-in-yemen. 
82 
Green, Daniel. “Al-Qaeda’s Shadow Government in Yemen.” The Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy. December 12, 2013. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/al-qaedas-shadow-government-in-yemen. 
Green, Daniel. “Al-Qaeda’s Soft-Power Strategy in Yemen.” The Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy. January 13, 2013. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/al-qaedas-soft-power-strategy-in-yemen. 
Groll, Elias. “Yemen on the Edge.” Foreign Policy, March 20, 2015. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/20/twin-suicide-bombings-in-yemen-may-mark-
islamic-state-foray-into-yemen/. 
Grynkewich, Alexus G. “Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social 
Services to Attack the State.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 
350–70. 
Guevara, Ernesto. Guerrilla Warfare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 
Haaretz. “The Bloody Hamas-Fatah Power Struggle That Threatens to Return following 
Gaza Assassination Attempt.” March 13, 2018. https://www.haaretz.com/middle-
east-news/palestinians/the-bloody-hamas-fatah-power-struggle-that-threatens-to-
reignite-1.5054803. 
Haddad, Simon. “The Origins of Popular Support for Lebanon’s Hezbollah.” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 1 (2006): 21–34. 
Haddad, Saleem, and Saleem Haddas. “Yemen: Divided Dissent.” The World Today 67, 
no. 3 (March 2011): 8–10. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41962628. 
Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. “Clan Conflicts, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese State.” The 
Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies (Winter 1994): 433–44. 
Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press, 
2006. 
Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. “Lebanon’s Islamists and Local Politics: A New Reality.” Third 
World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 739–59. 
Harik, Judith Palmer. “Between Islam and the System.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
40, no. 1 (1996): 41–67. 
Hill, Evan, and Laura Kasinof. “Playing a Double Game in the Fight Against AQAP.” 
Foreign Policy, January 21, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/21/playing-a-
double-game-in-the-fight-against-aqap-yemen-saleh-al-qaeda/. 
83 
Horton, Michael. “Capitalizing on Chaos: AQAP Advances in Yemen.” Terrorism 
Monitor 15, no. 4 (February 19, 2016): 8–12. https://jamestown.org/program/
capitalizing-on-chaos-aqap-advances-in-yemen/. 
Horton, Michael. “Fighting the Long War: The Evolution of Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula.” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 1 (January 2017): 17–22. https://ctc.usma.edu/
fighting-the-long-war-the-evolution-of-al-qaida-in-the-arabian-peninsula/. 
Hroub, Khaled. Hamas: A Beginners Guide. London: Pluto Press, 2006. 
Hroub, Khaled. Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Washington: Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 2000. 
Hull, Edmund James. High-value Target: Countering Al Qaeda in Yemen. Washington, 
DC: Potomac Books, 2011. 
Ibrahim, Alia, and Robin Wright. “Violence Paralyzes Beirut for Second Day.” 
Washington Post, May 9, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/05/08/AR2008050800518.html. 
International Crisis Group. “Dealing with Hamas.” September 26, 2004. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/
israelpalestine/dealing-hamas. 
International Crisis Group. “Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration.” 
January 18, 2006. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-
mediterranean/israelpalestine/enter-hamas-challenges-political-integration. 
International Crisis Group. “Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories: A Legitimate Target?” April 2, 2003. https://www.crisisgroup.org/
middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/israelpalestine/islamic-social-
welfare-activism-occupied-palestinian-territories-legitimate-target. 
International Crisis Group. “Yemen: A Humanitarian Catastrophe: A Failing State.” 
March 01, 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-
arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-catastrophe-failing-state. 
International Crisis Group. “Yemen’s Al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base.” February 2, 2017. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/
yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base. 
Israeli Ministry of Foreign “Affairs. Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since 
the Declaration of Principles.” September 1993. http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/
foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide and other bombing attacks in 
Israel since.aspx. 
84 
Jefferis, Jennifer L. Hamas: Terrorism, Governance, and Its Future in Middle East 
Politics. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2016. 
Johnsen, Gregory D. The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia. 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014. 
Johnsen, Gregory D. “Waning Vigilance: Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence in Yemen.” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. July 13, 2009. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/experts/view/gregory-johnsen. 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011. 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. “Performing the Nation-State: Rebel Governance and Symbolic 
Processes.” In Rebel governance in Civil War, edited by Ana Arjona, Nelson 
Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly, 74–97. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. 
Kasfir, Nelson. “Rebel Governance—Constructing a Field of Inquiry: Definitions, Scope, 
Patterns, Order, Causes.” In Rebel governance in Civil War, edited by Ana 
Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly, 21–46. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Keatinge, Tom. “Finances of Jihad: How Extremist Groups Raise Money.” BBC. 
December 12, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30393832. 
Kendall, Elisabeth. “What’s Next for Jihadists in Yemen?” Washington Post. February 
23, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/23/
whats-next-for-jihadists-in-yemen. 
Laub, Zachary. “Yemen in Crisis.” Council on Foreign Relations. April 19, 2016. 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis. 
Lebanese Hezbollah. “Open Letter Addressed to the Oppressed in Lebanon and the 
World.” News release, February 16, 1985. https://www.cia.gov/library/
readingroom/docs/DOC_0000361273.pdf.  
Leuprecht, Christian, Olivier Walther, David B. Skillicorn, and Hillary Ryde-Collins. 
“Hezbollah’s Global Tentacles: A Relational Approach to Convergence With 
Transnational Organized Crime.” Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 5 
(2015): 902–21. 
Levitt, Matthew. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 
85 
Levy, Elior. “Abbas’ Sanctions on Gaza Are Bad News for Both the Palestinians and 
Israel.” Ynetnews. March 27, 2018. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
5197605,00.html. 
Mampilly, Zachariah Cherian. Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life 
During War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. 
Mao Tse-Tung. Basic Tactics. New York: Praeger, 1966. 
Mao Tse-Tung. On Protracted War. Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2001. 
Masi, Alessandria. “Al Qaeda Winning Hearts and Minds Over ISIS in Yemen With 
Social Services.” International Business Times, April 7, 2016. 
http://www.ibtimes.com/al-qaeda-winning-hearts-minds-over-isis-yemen-social-
services-2346835. 
Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and 
Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 
Morag, Nadav. “A Tale of Two Failed Mideast states; The U.S. Should Act Forcefully 
and Not Allow Gaza and Lebanon to Remain Failed States.” Christian Science 
Monitor, August 7, 2006. 
Nasaw, Daniel. “Leaders of Muslim Charity in U.S. Found Guilty of Providing Funds to 
Hamas.” Guardian, November 24, 2008. https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2008/nov/24/holy-land-foundation-gaza-hamas. 
National Counterterrorism Center. “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” 
Accessed April 15, 2018. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/aqap.html. 
New York Times. “An End to Gaza’s Misery Is as Elusive as Peace.” February 13, 2018. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13/opinion/gaza-palestinians-israel-
blockade.html. 
Nikbakht, Daniel, and Sheena McKenzie. “Yemen War Is World’s Worst Humanitarian 
Crisis, UN Says.” CNN. April 03, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/03/
middleeast/yemen-worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-un-intl/index.html. 
Norton, Augustus Richard. “The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics.” The 
International Spectator 42, no. 4 (2007): 475–91. 
Perkins, Brian. “AQAP Surges in Yemen as War Rages.” Terrorism Monitor 13, no. 9 
(May 1, 2015). https://jamestown.org/program/aqap-surges-in-yemen-as-war-
rages/. 
86 
Perry, Tom. “Lebanon Political Conflict Turns Violent.” Reuters, May 6, 2008. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-strike/lebanon-political-conflict-turns-
violent-idUSL0761005520080507. 
Phillips, Sarah. “Al-Qaeda and the Struggle for Yemen.” Survival 53, no. 1 (January 28, 
2011): 95–120. 
Prusher, Ilene R. “Through Charity, Hezbollah Charms Lebanon.” Christian Science 
Monitor, April 19, 2000. 
Reuters. “Yemen’s Cholera Epidemic Likely to Intensify in Coming Months: WHO.” 
Reuters. February 26, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-
cholera/yemens-cholera-epidemic-likely-to-intensify-in-coming-months-who-
idUSKCN1GA225. 
Robinson, Glenn. “Hamas as Social Movement.” In Islamic Activism: A Social Movement 
Theory Approach, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz. 112–39. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2004.  
Robinson, Glenn E. “The Four Waves of Global Jihad, 1979–2017.” Middle East Policy 
24, no. 3 (Fall 2017): 70–88. 
Rose, Gregory. “Terrorism Financing in Foreign Conflict Zones.” Counter Terrorist 
Trends and Analyses 10, no. 2 (February 2018): 11–16. 
Rotberg, Robert I. “Failed States in a World of Terror.” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002). 
Roy, Sara M. Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. 
Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State. London: Chatham House, 
2016.  
Sharp, Jeremy M. Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. CRS Report No. 
R43960. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017.  
Simcox, Robin. "Ansar Al-Sharia and Governance in Southern Yemen." Hudson 
Institute. December 27, 2012. https://www.hudson.org/research/9779-ansar-al-
sharia-and-governance-in-southern-yemen. 
Stewart, Megan A. “Civil War as State-Making: Strategic Governance in Civil 
War.” International Organization 72, no. 1 (2018): 205–226.  
Swift, Christopher. “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar Al-Shari`a and the Struggle for 
Yemen.” CTC Sentinel. January 19, 2018. https://ctc.usma.edu/june-2012/. 
87 
Szekely, Ora. “Doing Well by Doing Good: Understanding Hamas’s Social Services as 
Political Advertising.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 4 (2015): 275–92. 
Tavernise, Sabrina. “Charity Wins Deep Loyalty for Hezbollah.” New York Times, 
August 6, 2006. 
Trofimov, Yaroslav. “U.S. Finds it Hard to Tag Hezbollah As a Terrorist Group.” Wall 
Street Journal, Europe, December 17, 2001. 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. “Gaza Blockade.” 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied 
Palestinian Territory. Accessed June 1, 2018. https://www.ochaopt.org/theme/
gaza-blockade. 
United States Department of State. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” 
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
United States Department of State. Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent 
Extremism. “Terrorist Designations of Ansar Al-Sharia as an Alias for Al-Qaida 
in the Arabian Peninsula.” Press release, October 4, 2012. https://www.state.gov/
j/ct/rls/other/des/266604.htm. 
United States Department of the Treasury. “Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism 
and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American 
Security on “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing.”“ Press release, 
March 4, 2014. https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl2308.aspx. 
Usher, Graham. “Hizballah, Syria, and the Lebanese Elections.” Journal of Palestine 
Studies 26, no. 2 (1997): 59–67. 
Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy. “Del Gobierno de Abajo al Gobierno de Arriba … and 
Back: Transitions to and from Rebel Governance in Latin America, 1956–1990.” 
In Rebel Governance in Civil War, edited by Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and 
Zachariah Mampilly, 47–73. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Wiegand, Krista E. Bombs and Ballots: Governance by Islamist Terrorist and Guerrilla 
Groups. London: Taylor and Francis, 2016. 
Wiegand, Krista E. “Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political 
Party.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 8 (2009): 669–80. 
88 
Winer, Jonathan M. “Countering Terrorist Finance: A Work, Mostly in Progress.” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 6, no. 18 (July 
2008): 112–32. 
Wittes, Tamara Cofman. Freedoms Unsteady March: America’s Role in Building Arab 
Democracy. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. Press, 2008. 
Wood, Reed M. “Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint? Rebel Capabilities, the 
Origins of Support, and Civilian Victimization in Civil War.” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 31, no. 5 (2013): 461–80. 
Wood, Reed M. “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians.” Journal of 
Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 601–14.  
Worth, Robert F., and Nada Bakri. “Hezbollah Seizes Swath of Beirut from U.S.-Backed 
Lebanon Government.” New York Times, May 10, 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/10/world/middleeast/10lebanon.html. 
Zahriyeh, Ehab. “Maps: The Occupation of the West Bank.” Al Jazeera America. July 4, 
2014. http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/7/west-bank-security.html. 
Zelin, Aaron Y., and Patrick Hoover. “What AQAP’s Operations Reveal about Its 
Strategy in Yemen.” War on the Rocks. August 23, 2015. 
https://warontherocks.com/2015/04/what-aqaps-operations-reveal-about-its-
strategy-in-yemen/. 
Ziboun, Kifah. “Fatah-Hamas Dispute Continues to Hinder Reconciliation.” Asharq Al-
Awsat. April 24, 2018. https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1247576/fatah-
hamas-dispute-continues-hinder-reconciliation. 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
